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ABSTRACT

In KPPermanent,the Supreme Court recently confirmed that plaintiffs in trademark infringement
cases under the Lanham Act have the burden of proving likelihood of confusion. As such, this article
argues that lower courts do not have the authority to switch that burden of proof for such claims,
even though they involve nominative uses (in which defendant is using the actual mark of plaintiff
as plaintiffs source identifier and not as a description of the defendant's products or services). This
article also argues that because Congress created affirmative fair use defenses for descriptive uses of
marks and for trademark dilution, but did not authorize such defense for nominative uses, courts do
not have the authority to create a separate fair use test where defendants have the burden of proof
on "fairness." Finally, the article shows that there is no need for a separate nominative fair use test
and that some of the unique issues that arise with nominative uses may justify switching to
defendants the burden of production, but not the burden of proof, on likelihood of confusion.
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ENDING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER USE OF A COMPETING MARK IN

ADVERTISING-THE BLACKSTONE CODE
DOUGLAS L. ROGERS*

INTRODUCTION

William Blackstone, the English jurist who lived in the 1700s, advised that if the
legislature "will positively enact a thing to be done, the judges are not at liberty to
reject it, for that were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which
would be subversive of all government."1 Interestingly, this advice, given almost 300
years ago, provides the code to unraveling the current split in the federal circuits
over the nominative use of a competitor's trademark in advertising.
Trademarks and service marks identify the source of a product or service.2 Such
marks are an owner's way of preventing "others from duping consumers into buying a
product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the trademark owner." 3 The
Lanham Act prohibits trademark and service mark infringement in order to prevent
confusion about the source or sponsorship of goods and services in the market. 4 For
* Douglas L. Rogers is a partner in the Columbus, Ohio office of Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
Pease LLP in the Litigation Group and the Technology and Intellectual Property Group.
1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (David S.
Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1783). "On such occasions the
Commentaries are apt to be construed as strictly as if they were a code." Id.
2 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S.
1171 (2003) ("A trademark is a word, phrase or symbol that is used to identify a manufacturer or
sponsor of a good or the provider of a service."); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,
248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed."),
superseded on other grounds, Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 640, n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Compare TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A trademark
gives a seller a 'property right' in his mark of identification, appurtenant to his property rights in
the goods he so marks .... "), with Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir.
1996) ("Because a trademark is an identifier rather than a property 'right,' the use of a competitor's
mark that does not cause confusion as to source is permissible."). A mark is not required to identify
the name of the company, but, for example, a consumer has a right to assume that two boxes of
cereal with the same mark on them originate from the same source, even if the consumer does not
know the source.
See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 15.8 (4th ed. 2005) ("Association with a single, though anonymous, source"); see also
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining trademark and service mark to indicate source, "even if that
source is unknown").
3 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900; see also Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac, Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1156
(9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the standards for infringement of trademarks under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 and infringement of service marks under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 are identical); Lane Capital
Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 344, n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the courts
generally use identical standards for trademark and service marks); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1054 (6th Cir. 1999) (using identical standards for trademark and
service mark infringement regarding proof of secondary meaning).
4 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992) ("The Lanham Act was
intended to make 'actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks' and 'to protect persons
engaged in commerce against unfair competition."') (citation omitted); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar

[5:157 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

instance, the Lanham Act would prohibit a company, Cheap Computers, Inc., from
selling its computers with the mark APPLE 5 because the key to a finding of
6
infringement under the Lanham Act is "likelihood of confusion."

Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) ("The Lanham Act provides national protection of
trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect
the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.").
The Senate Committee on Patents expressed the following views in connection
with the passage of the Lanham Act: The purpose of any trade-mark statute is
twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a
product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product,
he is protected in his investment from the misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
• . . Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make
possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish
one from the other.
S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 1274-75 (1946).
5 See
U.S.
Trademark
No.
2808567
(filed October
2,
2002)
available at
.http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=kpaObd.4.1.
APPLE is a registered mark of Apple
Computer, Inc. for the following goods and services:
computer consultation, design, testing, research and advisory services; research
and development of computer hardware and software; maintenance and repair of
computer

software

applications;

updating

of

computer

software;

computer

programming services; providing information concerning computers and computer
software over computer networks and global communication networks; computer
services, namely, hosting web sites and providing web site operation and
management services to others; computer services, namely, providing search
engines for obtaining data on computer networks and global communication
networks; leasing of computers, computer peripherals and computer software.
Id. Furthermore, because marks relate to products or services, two different companies can own the
same mark for use with different products or services. American Steel Foundaries v. Robertson, 269
U.S. 372, 380 (1926) ("The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trade-mark on his
goods does not prevent the adoption and use of the same trade-mark by others on articles of a
different description"). For example, Apple Computers, Inc. owns the mark MACINTOSH for
computers, but Miller Harness Company, L.L.C. owns the mark MACINTOSH for horse blankets.
U.S.
Trademark
No.
1460661
(filed
May
14,
1984)
available
at
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=kpa0bd.5.1 ; U.S. Trademark No. 2477040 (filed
December 8, 1998) available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=kpaObd.6.1.
6 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) provides that:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant ...
use in commerce
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause a mistake or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant..."
(emphasis added). 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (2000) provides that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable
in a civil action by any person [damaged or likely to be damaged].
(emphasis added).
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However, instead of trying to expropriate the mark of Apple Computers, Inc.,
Cheap Computers, Inc. might place an advertisement that compares, by name,
computers having the mark CHEAP on them with computers having the mark
APPLE on them. Courts refer to this type of use of another company's mark as
"nominative use." 7 Courts focusing on the "fair use" concept developed by two
circuits and discussed below as a test separate from likelihood of confusion might
hold such nominative use illegal, whereas the Sixth Circuit, focusing on likelihood of
8
confusion, might hold the use legal.
Considering traditional trademark infringement analysis, one of the most
important factors in determining if there is a likelihood of confusion is the similarity
of the marks used by the defendant and plaintiff.9 At first glance, this approach does
not seem to bring about the "right" result with nominative uses. In nominative use
situations, the defendant is using the exact or almost identical mark as the plaintiffs
mark, but there is no likelihood of confusion; hence, using "similarity of marks" as an
important factor could result in improper findings of infringement.1 In comparative
advertising, the advertiser is generally expressing the view that its product is better
than the competitor's product, and "[t]rademark rights do not entitle the owner to
quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or
7 As used by the courts, a nominative use includes situations in which a plaintiffs trademark is
used to refer to the plaintiffs product. See The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971
F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). However, it is also a nominative use for a defendant to use a
plaintiffs mark "to refer to the plaintiff trademark owner's product in order to help better describe
the defendant's product or service." Id.; Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425
F.3d 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2005). The examples the Third Circuit gave of such a combined nominative
use were a person who repaired Volkswagens advertising his business as Volkswagen Services and a
former Playboy Playmate advertising herself as Playmate of the Year 1981. A way to describe a
nominative use is a use by XYZ corporation of ABC's mark to identify source rather than to use it in

any primary descriptive meaning it may have. Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 909
(9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the normative fair use defense shifts the burden of proving likelihood of
confusion to the defendant). See generallyMERRIAM WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1535 (10th ed. 2002)
(defining nominative as "bearing a person's name.").
8 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'n, Int'l, No. 99-C-5565, 2005 WL 464688 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005). Ninth
Circuit cases subsequent to Now Tids show that the Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use defense has

evolved over time. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002). Compare
NewKds, 971 F.3d at 308 (using normative fair use to replace the likelihood of confusion test), with
PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Tech., LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (considering the normative
fair use defense as separate from the likelihood of confusion test and analyzing both).
9 Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) C [T]he similarity
of the marks, the defendant's intent, and evidence of actual confusion are of particular
importance."); A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir.
2000) ("The single most important factor in determining likelihood of confusion is mark similarity.");
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he similarity of the
marks . . . has always been considered a critical question in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.").
But ci Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1119 (6th Cir.
1996) ("[W]hile similarity [of marks] alone does not compel a determination that marks are likely to
be confused ....
it is a factor entitled to considerable weight .... ").
10 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding that the court should examine relevant and probative factors when deciding normative fair
use, including whether the marks are similar or identical). Sometimes a defendant is using the
exact word or letters, but the capitalization, font, or color of the marks may be different. See, e.g.,
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969), supplemented on
other issues by413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969).
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expressing points of view."11 To avoid improper findings of infringement, some
12
circuits have established what they refer to as a "nominative fair use defense."
As indicated above, however, the circuits have split on the applicable standard
for judging nominative uses. The Ninth Circuit has developed a test, appearing to be
a substitute for the traditional test for trademark infringement, that focuses on
whether defendant is using the mark fairly, and that places the burden of proving
such fairness on the defendant. 13 The Fifth Circuit has incorporated parts of the
Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use test as a supplement to the traditional test
without ruling on who has the burden of proof, but retaining likelihood of confusion
as the determinative issue. 14 In October of 2005, a panel of the Third Circuit, with
one judge dissenting in part, adopted a nominative fair use test utilizing a truncated
version of the traditional likelihood of confusion test, and added a new affirmative
15
fair use defense differing from the affirmative defense used by the Ninth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit has not adopted a nominative fair use test, and has retained the
traditional test.16
Thus, the Ninth and Third Circuits concluded that nominative fair use is an
issue separate from nominative likelihood of confusion, whereas the other circuits
have not. The Ninth and Third Circuits have also concluded that the defendant has
the burden of proof on the issue of fair use, whereas in the other circuits, the burden
remains with the plaintiff. This split makes it extremely difficult for lawyers to
advise companies doing business over multiple circuits about whether a proposed
nominative use is likely to constitute infringement.
This article takes the position that the Supreme Court should resolve the split
among circuits by holding that in nominative use cases, courts do not have authority
under the Lanham Act to create a separate fair use defense. If the Supreme Court
rejected a separate nominative fair use defense, plaintiffs would necessarily have the
burden of proof on the determinative issue-likelihood of confusion.
This article also takes the position, however, that the Ninth and Third Circuits
have a valid argument: plaintiffs should not have the sole responsibility for proof
because the best evidence of nominative use may be in the hands of the defendant.
In fact, once a plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to survive a motion for
directed verdict under the traditional likelihood of confusion test, the burden of
production may switch to the defendant to produce rebuttal evidence showing the
particular circumstances of the use.
Part I of this article shows that the Lanham Act puts the burden of proving
likelihood of confusion on the plaintiff and creates a number of fair use defenses, but
not in the case of nominative use. Part II addresses the development of the
11L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publ'r, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied 483 U.S.
1013 (1987).
12 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 824, 908
(2003).
:3 See The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308-09 (9th Cir.
1992); BrotherRecords, 318 F.3d at 900, cert. denied 540 U.S. 824, 908 (2003).
14 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545-47 (5th Cir. 1998).
1 Century 21, 425 F.3d at 232.
16 PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Tech., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) ("This circuit has
never followed the nominative fair use analysis .... We are not inclined to adopt the Ninth
Circuit's analysis here.").
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nominative fair use defense and argues that the Third and Ninth Circuits did not
have authority to create a separate nominative fair use defense or switch the burden
of proof to defendants. Part III argues that even if the authority existed, there was
no need to create such a separate defense because the traditional multi-factor test is
flexible enough to address appropriately nominative fair uses. Part IV concludes that
courts should reject separate nominative fair use defenses in trademark infringement
cases, and instead apply the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test flexibly, while
recognizing that the burden of production, but not the burden of proof, may switch to
the defendant.

I. THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A CLAIM OF TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT

A. The Multi-FactorTests of the Cireuits
The different circuits have adopted different multi-factor tests to determine
likelihood of confusion, but these tests are generally similar. 17 For instance, the
Sixth Circuit has adopted an eight-factor test: (1) strength of the senior mark;
(2) relatedness of the goods or services; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of
actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care;
(7) intent of the defendant in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of
product lines. 18 The Third Circuit has adopted a ten factor test.1 9 Other circuits
17 See, e.g., Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1994). A
plaintiff must prove in a trademark infringement case that: (1) "the mark is valid and legally
practicable; (2) the mark is owned by the plaintiff, and (3) the defendant's use of the mark to identify
goods and services is likely to create confusion concerning the origin of the goods or services." Id.
Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must also show that defendant used the mark in commerce
without the consent of plaintiff. See Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Stanly Works, 59 F.3d 384, 390 (2d
Cir. 1995) ("To establish a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant used in commerce, without the plaintiffs consent, a ... 'colorable imitation
of a registered mark ....')(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000)). The Fastenercourt also noted that "15
U.S.C. § 1125 prohibits similar conduct, though it is not limited to the uses of registered
trademarks." Id. at 390 n.4. "Fox's use of the domain names at issue cannot on the basis of a claim
for trademark infringement because none of the web sites corresponding to those domain names
overstep the boundaries of usage established as the 1993 Agreement .... [T]he standards for false
designation of origin claims . . . are the same as for trademark infringement claims." Twentieth
Century Fox Film & Marvel Enters. Inc., 220 F. Supp 2d 289, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). However,
§ 1114(1) expressly states the use must be "without the consent of the registrant," whereas § 1125(a)
does not expressly state the use must be without the consent of the mark holder. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 1114 (2000), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
18See Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Center, 109 F.3d 275, 280
(6th Cir. 1997); Frisch's Rest., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982).
19Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005).
(1) degree of similarity between the owner's mark and the alleged infringing
mark; (2) strength of the owner's mark; (3) price of the goods and other factors
indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a
purchase; (4) length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of
actual confusion; (5) intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) evidence of
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have adopted similar multi-factor tests. 20 The test for likelihood of confusion under
15 U.S.C. § 1114 is essentially identical to the test under § 1125.21
Each factor is not necessarily relevant in each case.22 The Ninth Circuit has
indicated that "a district court need not 'recite and apply' every factor; they are
merely 'helpful guidelines."'2 3 For instance, if a plaintiff sued a defendant upon
receiving notice that the defendant intended to use a particular mark the following
week, there could be no actual confusion. As a result, the Sixth Circuit's fourth
factor-evidence of actual confusion-would be irrelevant. Some circuits have stated
that courts must consider each factor, but presumably these courts may give such
24
factors no weight.
The multi-factor test, moreover, is not exhaustive. 25 Courts may consider other
factors that are relevant to likelihood of confusion. For instance, the Ninth Circuit
noted "non-listed variables may often be quite important," especially in the area of

actual confusion; (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed
through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same media; (8)
the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same; (9) the
relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of a similarity of
function; and (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect
the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market or that he is
likely to expand into that market.

Id.
20 See Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2004) (7 factors); Lipscher v. LRP
Publ'n, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (7 factors); Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes,
Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001) (7 factors); Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement,
Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 1999) (6 factors); Morningside Group, Ltd. v. Morningside Capital
Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1999) (8 factors); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd.,
155 F.3d 526, 543 (5th Cir. 1998) (7 factors); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 43
(1st Cir. 1998) (8 factors); and Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir.
1998) (6 factors); and Dr. Suess Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1997) (8 factors).
21 Soo Playtex Prod., Inc. v. Ga.-Pac.Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2004); Nabisco, Inc.
v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2000); Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295
F.3d 623, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2002); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 622-23
(6th Cir. 1996). Section 1125 does, however, prohibit a broader range of practices than § 1114. Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Actions under § 1125(a) are often
referred to as "false designation of origin" claims. See Playtex, 390 F.3d at 167; Nabisco, 220 F.3d
at 45.
22 See, e.g., IP.Lund Trading, 163 F.3d at 43 ("The factors are ... not always apt to the
particular facts of a case.").
23 Wolfard Glassblowing Co. v. Vanbragt, 118 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Eclipse
Assocs., Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1990)).
24 Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1993) (examining
eight factors); Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Center, 109 F.3d 275,
280 (6th Cir. 1997) ("a court must examine and weigh the following eight factors"); New Kayak Pool
Corp. v. R&P Pools, Inc., 246 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that it is "incumbent upon the
district judge to engage in a deliberate review of each factor, and, if a factor is inapplicable to each
case, to explain why") (quoting Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir.
1995)).
25 See, e.g., Morningside, 182 F.3d at 139; Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1404; Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d
at 543; IP.Lund Trading, 163 F.3d at 43.
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emerging technologies. 26 Similarly, the Second Circuit has stated "other factors may
27
be added".
Courts probably do not specify additional factors because the multi-factor tests
are flexible, and the factors are not applied in a mechanistic or mathematical way. 28
For instance, courts compare marks within the context and setting in which they
appear, rather than considering the two marks in isolation. 29 When such context is
considered, the use of the defendant's mark with the plaintiffs mark can make a
court directly conclude confusion is unlikely without resorting to specifying "setting
30
in the marketplace" as a separate factor.
In other words, courts can adjust the application of the factors to address
varying conditions, including nominative uses, while always keeping in mind the
ultimate issue-likelihood of confusion. The next section of this article shows why,
as a matter of law, it is necessary for courts to keep the burden of proof for likelihood
of confusion on the plaintiff.

B.

The Burden of Prooffor Likelihood of Confusion

In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case has the burden of
proving likelihood of confusion. 3 1 Both KP and Lasting made permanent makeup, "a

26 Brookfield Comme'n, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Some factors are much more important than others, and the relative importance of each individual
factor will be case-spectific.").
27 Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1998) ("These factors are
not always dispositive ... and other factors may be added or initial factors abandoned.").
28 See, e.g., Dr. Suess, 109 F.3d at 1404; Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 543; Century21, 425
F.3d at 224; Daddy's JunkyMusic Stores, 109 F.3d at 280.
29 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 458 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[I]mpression' created by the
setting in which the mark is used is often of critical importance") (quoting Spring Mills, Inc. v.
Ultraeashmere House Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 2004)); Entrepreneur Media,Inc. v. Smith,
279 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) ("(1) Marks should be considered in their entirety and as they
appear in the marketplace; (2) Similarity is best adjudged by, appearance, sound, and meaning");
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) ('[A]
court should not consider 'how closely a fragment of a given use duplicates the trademarks', but
must instead consider 'whether the use in its entirety creates a likelihood of confusion') (quoting
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 319 (4th Cir), cert. denied 506 U.S. 872
(1992); Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1998) ([W]e consider
the marks as they are encountered by the consumer in the marketplace")). Cf Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225 (3d Cir. 2005) (similarity of the marks "does not
leave any room for the context of the use - i.e., that the mark is being used to describe the plaintiffs
own product.").
30 AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 796 (6th Cir. 2004); Nabisco, Inc. v. WarnerLambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2000, elfAmericana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966
F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1992).
31 KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). Lower federal
courts had previously held that plaintiffs had the burden of proof for likelihood of confusion in
trademark infringement cases. See, e.g., Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d
1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing likelihood of confusion under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000)); King of
the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F.Supp. 568, 572 (D. Colo. 1997), afd 185 F.3d

[5:157 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

mixture of pigment and liquid for injection under the skin to camouflage injuries,"
and each used some version of the word "microcolor" while marketing and selling
their products. 32 Lasting registered the trademark MICRO COLORS in 1993, and by
1999 that registration became incontestable.33 In 1999, KP distributed a ten-page
advertising brochure using the word "microcolors" to describe its products. 34 Lasting
demanded that KP stop using the term. 35 KP sued Lasting, requesting a declaratory
judgment that KP's use of the word did not infringe Lasting's trademark. 36 Lasting
37
counterclaimed for trademark infringement.
The district court found Lasting had conceded that KP used the term microcolors
"only to describe its goods and not as a mark," and granted summary judgment for
KP on the basis of a descriptive fair use defense. 38 However, the district court did not
inquire whether KP's use was likely to cause consumer confusion, and the Ninth
Circuit reversed because it concluded no use could be fair when consumer confusion
39
was possible.
On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that, even for incontestable
trademarks, the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case must carry the burden of
proving likelihood of confusion, and remanded to the Ninth Circuit. 40 The descriptive
fair use defense is available to a person whose "use of the name, term, or device
charged to be an infringement is a use ... which is descriptive of and used fairly and
in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party ....-41 The Court
noted that "Congress said nothing about likelihood of confusion in setting out the
elements of the fair use defense in § 1115(b)(4)."42 Indeed, the Court held it was not
plausible that Congress would have used the phrase "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or deceive" to describe an element of trademark infringement in
§ 1114, but would rely on a different phrase-"used fairly"-in establishing a fair use
43
defense in § 1115(b)(4), if Congress had meant to impose the identical standard.
Therefore, the fair use defense in § 1115 did not affect the burden on the plaintiff to
44
prove likelihood of confusion.
1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1999) (analyzing likelihood of confusion claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125

(2000)).
32 KPPormannt,543

U.S. at 114.

'33Id.
34 Id.
36Id.
37 Id.at

38

115.

d.at 115-16.

'39
KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003).
KP Permanent,543 U.S. at 116 (finding that the 9th Circuit thought the district courts analysis of
fair use without "delving into the matter of possible confusion" was an error).
40Id. at 117. The Supreme Court stated 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) "requires a showing that the
defendant's actual practice is likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin
of the goods or services in question." Id. Additionally, the Court emphasized that "[s]ection 1115(b)
[which refers to proof of infringement under § 1114] places a burden of proving likelihood of
confusion (that is infringement) on the party charging infringement even when relying on an
incontestable registration." Id. at 118.
41 Id.at 118. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
42KPPermanent,543 U.S. at 118.
43Id. at 118.

44Id.at 124.
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The Supreme Court did note that the risk of consumer confusion could be a
factor in determining whether a use constituted a fair use. 45 The Court explained,
"[o]ur holding that fair use can occur along with some degree of confusion does not
foreclose the relevance of the extent of any likely consumer confusion in assessing
whether a defendant's use is objectively fair." 46 The Court held that "the defendant

has no independent burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in raising the
affirmative defense that a term is used descriptively, not as a mark, fairly and in
good faith .... ."47 However, the Court did not address the role of likelihood of
confusion in nominative fair use cases or the elements necessary for a defendant to
48
establish the statutory affirmative defense of fair use.

In short, the Court in KP Permanentclearly held that the Lanham Act placed
the burden of proof for likelihood of confusion on the plaintiff and recognized an
affirmative descriptive fair use defense for the defendant, but did not place a burden
on the defendant to negate confusion. Although the Court acknowledged that
confusion and unfair use might overlap, it is clear that the Court concluded confusion
and unfair use are separate concepts.
The next section discusses the two statutory affirmative defenses under the
Lanham Act. The first is the descriptive fair use defense in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
The second is the fair use defense to claims of dilution of famous trademarks
established in § 1125(c)(4)(A). These two defenses are not applicable in nominative
use situations. Indeed, Congress did not provide for a nominative fair use defense
49
under the Lanham Act.

45Id.at 123.
46

Id.

47 Id.

at 124.

Id.at 115. On the issue of nominative fair use, the Court said, "Nor do we address the Court
of Appeals's discussion of'nominative fair use."' Id. There are a number of questions that remain to
be answered about the classic fair use defense as a result of the decision in K.P. Permanent. See,
e.g., Nikki Pope, Still a Ball of Confusion.IKP PermanentMake-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions j
Inc., 4 CHI-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 289, 299-300 (2005) (reasoning that "[t]he court did not...
48

offer any guidance as to just how much confusion would be needed to tip the scales against a finding
of fair use ....
Issues specifically avoided included ... whether 'used fairly' means the term used
accurately described the goods ....
").
41)
See Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (finding, as a matter of statutory construction,
when 'Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is presumed' that it was done "intentionally and purposely ....');N.
Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (using the same concept of statutory construction
in an employment matter context); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1979)
(reaffirming the same concept of statutory construction on an interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3)
(2000)). Whether state courts should recognize a nominative fair use defense to a state law claim of
unfair competition or trademark infringement is beyond the scope of this article.
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C. The StatutoryFairUse Defenses

1. Deseriptive FairUse in TrademarkInfringement Claims
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) provides a defense to a claim of trademark infringement
when "the use of the name, term, or device charged to be infringement is a use ... of
a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly in good faith only to describe
the goods or services of such party, or their geographical origin.
...50 Courts refer
to this statutory provision as the descriptive or classic fair use defense, which is only
available when the defendant uses letters that are the plaintiffs mark to describe the
51
defendant's own product or service.
Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries,Inc. provides a clear example of such
descriptive fair use. 52 Sunmark produced SWEETARTS, a fruit-flavored sugar
candy. 53 Sunmark sued Ocean Spray for advertising one of Ocean Spray's sugar54
flavored cranberry juice drinks as tasting "sweet and tart" or "sweet-tart."
Although SWEETARTS was an incontestable mark for the candy in question, Judge
Easterbrook noted that the fact did "not make Sunmark the gatekeeper of those
words for the whole industry."55 Defendant Ocean Spray did not contest the validity
50 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). Although by its terms § 1115 applies to registered trademarks
that have become incontestable and defenses that still may be applicable to such marks, the fair use
defense in § 1115 has been applied to actions containing both § 1114 and § 1125 claims. See CarFreshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1995) ("It is a fundamental
principle marking an outer boundary of the trademark monopoly that, although trademark rights
may be acquired in a word or image with descriptive qualities, the acquisition of such rights will not
prevent others from using the word or image in good faith in its descriptive sense, and not as a
trademark"); Patrick Frye, An InternetAdvertising Service Can Constitute "Use in Commerce', 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89, 108 n.210 (2005) (finding that not only does fair use
analysis complement a likelihood of confusion analysis but that § 1115(b)(4) is a defense against 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2000)).
51 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002).
52 Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, 64 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 1995). The distinction
between classic fair use and nominative fair use is not always clear, if the question posed is whether
defendant is using the mark to describe its product or to identify plaintiffs product. See Brother
Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that "whether classic fair use
analysis or nominative fair use analysis applies-is not clear."). For instance, when a former Playboy
Bunny advertised on the web as being a former Playboy Bunny, was she simply describing herself,
which could be a classic fair use defense, or was she describing plaintiffs mark (which could be
nominative fair use)? See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F.Supp. 2d 1066, 1075 (S.D.
Cal. 1999), affd in part,rev'd in partPlayboy Enter., Inc., 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing
the analysis of both the nominative and classic fair use). The better way to identify nominative use
is to ask whether defendant is using plaintiffs mark in its primary descriptive sense (assuming it
has a primary descriptive sense) or whether she is using the mark in its trademark sense as a short
hand way of identifying source. See Brother Roeords, 318 F.3d at 908 ("Where the defendant uses
the trademark not in its primary descriptive sense, but rather in its secondary trademark sense, the
nominative fair use analysis applies.").
53 Sunmark, Inc., 64 F.3d at 1057.
54 Id.
55, Id. at 1058. As a general matter, a registered mark in continuous use for five (5) years after
registration becomes incontestable. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000). 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) provides that such
'registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the
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of the trademark, but argued Ocean Spray had a right to use the descriptive phrase
sweet-tart under the fair use statute, § 1115(b)(4). 56 The issue was not whether the
registered mark as used by Sunmark was descriptive, but rather whether "sweettart" as used by Ocean Spray was descriptive.5 7 The Seventh Circuit added that "for
a mark to be considered descriptive, it merely needs to refer to a characteristic of the
product."5 8 The fact that the mark was not in the dictionary did not make a
difference. 5 9 Both words, "sweet" and "tart", were referring to a characteristic of
60
Ocean Spray's product, and hence, descriptive.
In Cosmetieally Sealed Industries, Ine. v. Chesebrough-Ponds USA Co., the
Second Circuit recognized the descriptive fair use defense even though the terms at
issue did not refer to a characteristic of the defendant's product. 61 Cosmetically
Sealed Industries, Inc., the holder of a registered mark for lip gloss, SEALED WITH
62
A KISS, sued Chesebrough-Ponds for its use of the phrase "Seal it with a Kiss!!"
The Second Circuit stated that descriptive terms were not "narrowly confined to
words that described a characteristic of the goods, such as size or quality," but could
include describing the effect of using the product or actions the advertiser expects the
consumer could take while using the product. 63 Cheseborough-Ponds used the phrase
"Seal it with a Kiss!!" in a promotional display inviting consumers to use a
Cheseborough-Ponds lip gloss to put a kiss on a postcard and mail the postcard to
someone the consumer knew. 64 The court added that "if any confusion results, that is
a risk that plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that
65
uses a well-known descriptive phrase."
registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark and of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the registered mark in commerce," 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000). This is subject to certain
defenses in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b), including the fair use defense in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
56 Sunmark, Inc., 64 F.3d at 1059.
57 Id.

5S Id. The court added: "Wehave some difficulty understanding how Ocean Spray can be said
to use the words 'sweet-tart' as a way of identifying the origin of its product, an essential ingredient
of usage as a trademark." Id. McCarthy says the issue is not whether plaintiffs mark is descriptive,
albeit with secondary meaning, but instead that "the key is the junior user's descriptive use ....
The policy rationale is that no one competitor can use trademark law to exclude others from use of a

word in its primary, descriptive and non-trademark sense." 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:45 (4th ed. 2005).
59 Sunm ark nc., 64 F.3d at 1059.
60 Id. Of course, "tart" can be a noun, but was not being used as a noun (e.g., a small pie or
pastry shell) in Sunmark.
(1 Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1997).
62 Id.at 29-30.
1 Id. at 30.
64Id. at 29-30. The court looked favorably on the fact that Cheseborough-Pond's clearly used
its own trademark stating, "The non-trademark use of the challenged phrase and the defendants'
good faith are both evidenced by the fact that the source of the defendants' product is clearly
identified by the prominent display of the defendants' own trademarks." Id. at 30.
65 Id. See also In Re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., Go-Video, Inc., 11
F.3d 1460, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1993) (using the term VCR-2 to designate one of two VCR jacks on
videocassette recorders was a descriptive fair use in spite of Go-Video's trademark registration of
VCR-2 for a two-deck videocassette recorder); Wonder Labs, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 728 F.
Supp. 1058, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (using the phrase "Dentists choice" in P&G's promotion of Crest
toothpaste was a classic fair use, in spite of the existence of WonderLab's trademark DENTIST'S
CHOICE for use on the toothbrushes); Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan Co., 177 F.3d 258, 270-71
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A company uses a word as a trademark when it identifies the source of the
product or service. 66 When a word can be both descriptive and used as a mark,
determination of which use is at issue can depend on the location, capitalization, or
font of the word. 67 In TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., for
instance, the holder of the mark THE CHILDREN'S PLACE sued Haar
Communications for using the domain name "thechildrensplace.com". 68 The Second
Circuit rejected the descriptive fair use defense, finding that the domain name
registration and use was "not simply an adjectival use, as might be the case if Haar
named his web site otherwise, but referred to it in publicity materials as A Children's
Place." 69 In EngineeredMechanical Services, Inc. v. Applied Mechanical Technology,
Inc., the owner of the trademark METALOCK used the mark to identify a process for
repairing cracked or broken machinery or castings, as well as to identify the metal
bars or fasteners used as "locks." 70 The owner sued the defendant for its use of the
word "Metalock." 71 Rejecting the fair use defense, the court noted "defendants' use
has been in the trademark sense. Defendants have used a word in capital letters and
have otherwise made it prominent in their advertising brochures." 72 These cases
make clear that the fair use defense in § 1115(b)(4) is not available if defendant is
using the letters or words in question as a mark.

(5th Cir. 1999) ("The fair-use defense allows a party to use a term in good faith to describe its goods
or services. . . . The fair-use defense does not apply if a term is used as a mark to identify the
markholder's goods or services .... "). Courts have rejected the classic fair use defense when the
court determined the defendant was not acting in good faith. See, e.g., Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc.
v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F.Supp. 2d 488, 502 (E.D. Va. 1999), af'cd 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir.
2002).
66 See Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) ("A 'merely
descriptive' mark ...
describes the qualities or characteristic of a good or service, and this type of
mark may be registered only if the registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., it
'has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce' . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (0"); Official
Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that when used to describe
marks are "used to describe a product" and the mark "does not inherently identify a particular
source and therefore cannot be protected ....
It may nevertheless be entitled to protection if it has
acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning ....
A mark acquires secondary meaning if
customers associate the mark with a particular source."); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:25 (4th ed. 2005) (stating that "[t]rademark protection
for descriptive marks is extended only in recognition of consumer acceptance and recognition of such
marks is denoting only one seller or source").
67 See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc'ns., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding that, even though "a children's place" was used as an adjective, its use in publicity materials
disqualified it as a fair use defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)).
6 Id. at 92.
69 Id. at 104.
70 Eng'rd. Mechal. Servs., Inc. v. Applied Mechal. Tech., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (E.D. La.

1984).
71 Jd

72 Id. at 1158.
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2. FairUse in TrademarkDilution Cases
Congress created a civil cause of action for the dilution of famous trademarks in
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) in 1995. 7 3 The elements of a claim of trademark dilution are that:
(1) the senior mark is famous; (2) the senior mark became famous before the use of
the junior mark began; (3) the junior mark must be a commercial use in commerce;
(4) the senior mark must be distinctive; and (5) the use of the challenged mark
"causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." 74 In contrast to a claim of
trademark infringement, likelihood of confusion is not an element of trademark
75
dilution.
As part of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Congress created a dilution fair
use defense. Specifically, § 1125(c)(4) provides that "[flair use of a famous mark by
another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the
competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark" is not actionable as
trademark dilution. 76 Of course, by its terms, the defense created in § 1125(c)(4) is
77
not applicable to a claim of trademark infringement.

D. The Failureof Congress to Enact a Nominative FairUse Defense
Congress provided an affirmative fair use defense in § 1115(b)(4) to a claim of
trademark infringement when a defendant is using a word only in its descriptive
sense, and not as a mark. 78
Congress provided another fair use defense in
§ 1125(c)(4) to a claim of trademark dilution when defendant is using a famous mark
as a mark.79 Congress did not provide for a fair use defense to a claim of trademark
infringement for the use of letters or words as a mark. As a result, courts must
conclude that Congress did not intend to authorize a nominative fair use defense in a
80
trademark infringement case.
7:3 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 420, 430-31 (2003). The Federal
Trademark Dilation Act of 1995 became effective on January 16, 1996. The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
71 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999). This was cited by the
Supreme Court in Moseley. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425-26. Other circuits, however, have not held
that distinctiveness is a separate element of the cause of action. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391
F.3d 439, 449 (2nd Cir. 2004); and Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C.,
212 F.3d 157, 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1071 (2001); A. M. Gen. Corp. v.
Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 811 (7th Cir. 2002).
57Moseley 537 U.S. at 429 ("Neither the absence of confusion nor the absence of competition,
however, provides a defense to the statutory dilution claim ....
Unlike traditional infringement
law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development,
and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers"). 15 U.S.C. § 1127 defines dilution to
mean "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
76 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000).
77

Id.

78 Jd

79Id.
80 See Russello v. U. S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting U.S. v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720,
722 (5th Cir. 1972)) (affirming, as a rule of statutory construction, when "'Congress includes

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
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The next section of the article discusses the development of the nominative fair
use defense by courts and the concomitant switching of the burden of proof to the
defendant when it raises the defense.

II.

THE JUDICIAL CREATION OF NOMINATIVE FAIR USE DEFENSES

Part A of this section explains that the Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use
defense is a substitute for the traditional likelihood of confusion test and places the
burden of negating likelihood of confusion on the defendant. 81 Part B discusses the
recent Third Circuit decision on nominative use which keeps the burden of proof for
likelihood of confusion on the plaintiff, but creates a separate fair use defense that
places the burden of proof on the defendant for the issue of fair use.8 2 Part C
discusses the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the fact-finder should add elements to
the traditional likelihood of confusion test rather than create a separate nominative
fair use defense. 83 This section concludes that the Fifth Circuit's approach was
correct based on the facts presented in that case, but suggests additional procedures
to apply in other nominative use cases.

A. The Ninth Circuit Createsa Nominative Fair Use Test That Is a Substitute for
the TraditionalMulti-FactorTest and That Switches the Burden ofProof
1. A Separate Nominative FairUse Defense on Likelihood of Confusion
The first court to adopt nominative fair use test was the Ninth Circuit in New
Kids on the Block v. News America Publications, Inc.84 New Kidis involved
newspaper polls asking the public which member of The New Kids On The Block was
85
most popular, using NEW KIDS and NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK in the polls.
The New Kids On The Block sued and alleged, among other things, trademark
infringement.8 6 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on
the ground that the First Amendment right to freedom of the press protected the
87
defendants.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding that when a defendant
uses a trademark to identify the plaintiffs product, the defendant is entitled to a

presumed' that it was done "intentionally and purposely ... ');see also, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Ed.
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (using the same concept in employment matters); United States. v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1979) (using the same concept in a 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) matter).
81D.J. Westberg, New Kds on the Block v. News Am. Publg, Inc.." New Nominative Use
Defense Increases The Likelihood Of Confusion SurroundingThe FairUse Defense To Trademark
Infringement,24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 685, 709 (1994).
82 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir. 2005).
83 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 547 (5th Cir. 1998).
84 The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
85 Id. at 304. The Ninth Circuit described The New Kids on the Block as "reputedly one of
today's hottest musical acts." -d.
8 Id. at 304.
87 The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Calif. 1990).
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nominative fair use defense-if he meets three requirements.88
requirements are:

Those three

(1) the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without the use of the trademark; 89
(2) only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; 90 and
(3) the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder. 91
According to the court, one need for this new test was that "it is often virtually
impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point
of reference or any other such purpose without using the mark." 92 Accordingly, the
Court found nominative fair use "does not constitute unfair competition; such use is
fair because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder."

93

The Ninth Circuit gave as examples of nominative fair use, cases involving a
Volkswagen dealer using VOLKSWAGEN in advertisements, a television station
advertising that it would broadcast news about the BOSTON MARATHON, parodies,
and companies comparing their products with the products of competitors. 94 In each
of the examples cited by the court, nominative use of the mark had been held to be
permissible because the defendant had been using the words to indicate correctly the
source of the product or service. 95 However, in the cases cited in New Kids the courts
did not use a separate nominative fair use test but nevertheless approved the uses,
raising the question of whether a separate nominative fair use test is necessary. 96
The Ninth Circuit in New Kids did not state why a court could not address
nominative fair use under the multi-factor test, and did not expressly state that the

88 The New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308-10.
89 fd.at 308.
90 Id.; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002) ([w]here

...
the description of the defendant's product depends on the description of the plaintiffs product, more
use of the plaintiffs trademark is 'reasonably necessary' to identify the plaintiffs product than in
cases where the description of the defendant's product does not depend on the description of the
plaintiffs product.").
91 Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1154.
92 The New Kds on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306. This justification became factor (1) of the
nominative fair use test. As an example of this factor, the Ninth Circuit said, "reference to a large
automobile manufacturer based in Michigan would not differentiate among the Big Three." Id. at
306-07. The Ninth Circuit based the second factor of the nominative fair use test on two cases cited
in footnote 7 of its opinion. Id. at 308 n.7. These cases stated that using more of a plaintiffs mark
than is necessary constitutes infringement. Id.
93 The New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (9th Cir. 1992). Doing nothing that implies
sponsorship or endorsement became factor (3) of the nominative fair use test. Id.
94See Volkswagonwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969); WCVB-TV
v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991); Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg.
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).

99 The Now KJi"ds on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309.
6 See generallyWestberg, supranote 81.
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nominative fair use defense was a substitute for the traditional multi-factor test on
97
likelihood of confusion.
However, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, the Ninth Circuit expressly
held that the nominative fair use test was a substitute for the traditional multi-factor
test.98 In Welles, the defendant used the terms "Playboy" and "Playmate" in her
website advertising because she had been Playboy's "Playmate of the Year 1981." 99
Playboy claimed that the following four uses of its trademarked terms on the
defendant's website constituted trademark infringement: (1) the terms "Playboy"
and "Playmate" in the metatags of the website; (2) "Playmate of the Year 1981" on
the masthead of the website; (3) "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981" and "Playmate
of the Year 1981" on various banner ads; and (4) the repeated use of the abbreviation
"PMOY 81" as a watermark on website pages. 100
The district court granted
defendant Welles summary judgment on all the trademark infringement claims on
the basis of both descriptive fair use under § 1115(b)(4) and nominative fair use. 10 1

97Id. at 686. Westberg analyzed the decision in New Kids and said nominative fair use was an
unnecessary and confusing addition to trademark law. Id. at 685. Westberg also said "the first
requirement of nominative use, that the product not be readily identifiable without using its
trademark, is included within the [descriptive] fair use requirement that the trademark be used in a
descriptive sense." Id. at 704. However, although in the nominative use situation the mark may be
descriptive to the extent that it describes or identifies the source of a product, generally a mark does
not describe the actual product. For instance, the mark APPLE owned by Apple Computers, Inc.
does not describe, as a word, any products made by Apple Computers, Inc.. The mark simply tells
the consumer the source of the products. Similarly, the mark MACINTOSH is also owned by Apple
Computers, but the word does not describe the product. The descriptive fair use defense can only
apply to use of "a term or device which is descriptive of and uses fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services of such party" 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
If the
descriptive use is only part of the reason for using another's mark, then the descriptive fair use
defense in § 1115(b)(4) is inapplicable. Id. at 694. Of course, one may believe that Congress should
not have used the word "only" in § 1115(b)(4), but because Congress did, § 1115(b)(4) is inapplicable
to nominative uses that even in part refer to someone other than the defendant as a source of
products or services. Id. at 704.
98 Playboy Enters., Inc. v.Terri Welles, Inc., 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002). The court said
that when a "defendant raises a nominative fair use test, the above three-factor test should be
applied instead of the test for likelihood of confusion set forth in Sleekeraft." Id. Sleeke-raft is the
Ninth Circuit case establishing the 8 factor test used by the Ninth Circuit to determine likelihood of
confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-349 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) ("nominative fair use analysis ... replaces
the likelihood of customer confusion analysis set forth in Skeokeraft.").
99 PlayboyEnters.,Inc., 279 F.3d at 800.
100 Id. at 800.
101 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F.Supp. 2d 1066, 1078, 1090-1091 (S.D. Calif.
1999). The district court said "in order to constitute a non-trademark, 'fair use', the use cannot
amount to a trademark infringement or unfair competition." Id. at 1081. That "test," however, puts
the cart before the horse. A party may be using XYZ as a mark, without infringing the mark
APPLE, because the two marks are not similar, and consumers would have no reason to believe a
product marked XYZ came from the same source as the product marked APPLE. The lack of
infringement does not mean XYZ was not being used as a mark, but means there was no likelihood
of confusion between XYZ and APPLE. The district court also applied the eight Sleekeraft factors
and found "the totality of the Sloekeraft factors does not compel a finding of a likelihood of
confusion." Id. at 1082. This again raises the question of what is the need for a nominative fair use
test.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the nominative fair use defense only.10 2
The court explained that the test for nominative fair use could arise "when a
trademark also describes a person".10 3 Such use is use as a mark because PLAYBOY
PLAYMATE necessarily suggested to the consumer that Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
had endorsed her position.1 0 4 The words PLAYBOY PLAYMATE were a short-hand

10 5
method for identifying the sponsor of her prior role.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Playboy Enterprises showed that the first
element of the nominative fair use test, established in New Kids, was not the
impossibility of describing a product or person without use of the trademark, but was
practicality. 10 6 In Ms. Welles' case, "describ[ing] herself as the 'nude model selected
by Mr. Heffner's magazine as its number-i prototypical woman for the year 1981'
would be impractical as well as ineffectual in identifying Terry Welles to the

public."

10 7

On the second element of the nominative fair use test-only using so

much of the mark as is reasonably necessary-the court concluded that "Welles'
banner advertisements and headlines satisfy this element because they use only the
trademarked words, not the font or symbols associated with the trademarks."'1 08 On
the third element, the court concluded that "it would be unreasonable to assume that
[Playboy] currently sponsors or endorses someone who describes herself as a 'Playboy
Playmate of the Year in 1981."'109 The court affirmed the finding of nominative fair
use on the first three claims.1 10

2. Switching the Burden of Proofto the Defendant
In Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, the Ninth Circuit expressly held that the
defendant had the burden of proof in the nominative fair use defense on the issue of
likelihood of confusion, something not explicitly decided in NewKids or Welles.111 In
Jardine,the holder of the mark THE BEACH BOYS, Brother Records, sued a former
102 PlayboyEnters., Inc., 279 F.3d at 802.

Id. at 802.
Id.at 803.
105 Id. at 804.

103

104

10c,
Id.at 803.
107 Id. at 802. The first element is "the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without the use of the trademark." Id.
108 Id. at 802. The second element is "only so much of the mark may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service." Id.
109 Id.at 803. The Third element is "the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with
the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." Id.at 802. The court said
it did not express an opinion whether an individual's use of a current title would suggest
sponsorship or endorsement. Id.
110 Id.at 804. The court reversed on the use of PMOY81 as background on the site, noting "the
term does not even appear to describe Welles," and thus failed the first part of the nominative fair
use test. Id
111 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). ("whereas plaintiff
carries the burden of persuasion in a trademark infringement claim to show likelihood of confusion, .
• .the nominative fair use defense shifts to the defendant the burden of proving no likelihood of
confusion.") Since the nominative fair use defense is a substitute for the multi-factor test, plaintiff
should have no burden. Id. However, presumably after plaintiff shows that defendant is using
plaintiffs mark as a mark, the defendant has the burden to negate confusion. Id.
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member of the Beach Boys, Al Jardine, for using THE BEACH BOYS in connection
with his new band. 112 The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiff, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.11 3 The Ninth Circuit concluded that because the
defendant did not use the mark in its primary descriptive meaning, descriptive fair
use was not applicable. 114 The Ninth Circuit then applied the New Kids nominative
fair use factors, but, in addition, considered actual consumer confusion in affirming
the district court's finding of trademark infringement.11 5 The court concluded that
"Jardine's use of the trademark caused actual consumer confusion, as both event
organizers that booked Jardine's band and people who attended Jardine's shows
' 116
submitted declarations expressing confusion about who was performing."
The Ninth Circuit noted that its third nominative fair use factor-"the lack of
anything that suggests sponsorship or endorsement-is merely the other side of the
likelihood of confusion coin."11 7 The Ninth Circuit stated that in a traditional
trademark infringement case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving likelihood of
confusion. 118 However, without citing any authority, the court held "the nominative
fair use defense shifts to the defendant the burden of proving no likelihood of
confusion." 1 19

Interestingly, in Jardine, the Ninth Circuit admitted that in nominative use
situations, "the defendant uses the trademark not in its primary, descriptive sense,
but rather in its secondary, trademark sense."1 20 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
because the defendant had not used THE BEACH BOYS in the primary descriptive
1 21
sense, the descriptive fair use defense in § 1115(b)(4) could not apply.
Id. at 901-03.
11"
Id.at 903.

112

114 Id. at 907. The Ninth Circuit said the primary descriptive meaning of the term was "boys
who frequent a stretch of sand beside the sea." Id. The Ninth Circuit noted the difficulty at times in
distinguishing between a classic fair use situation and a nominative fair use situation:
"Jardine illustrates this point with his conflicting arguments (1) that his use
of 'The Beach Boys' mark describes the Beach Boys' product, thus requiring
application of the nominative fair use analysis, and (2) that, in the alternative, his
use of 'The Beach Boys' mark only describes himself-a founding member of the
Beach Boys-and not at all to describe the Beach Boys' product, thus requiring
application of the classic fair use analysis .... In these situations, the referenceto-trademark-holder distinction often prove more frustrating than helpful."
Id. at 905.
5
11 Id. at 905-06.
116Id.at 908. This article does not address the separate question of whether consumers would
be more confused by seeing a band called the Beach Boys performing without Al Jardine or by seeing
Al Jardine perform with a group that could not use the name Beach Boys. In other words, in some
situations, does trademark law not prevent consumer confusion but only promote business rights?
117 Id. at 909.
1s Id.at 909.
119 Id.at 909.
120 Id. at 908. Although the court cited Now -ids, for this proposition, as noted above, in Now
Kids, the Ninth Circuit said, "Cases like these [nominative use cases] are best understood as
involving or non-trademark use of a mark ...." The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992). In other words, the Ninth Circuit's analysis appeared to be
evolving. This makes it difficult, of course, to predict outcomes in future cases.
121 Brother Roeords, Inc., 318 F.3d at 907. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit analyzed both the
descriptive fair use defense and nominative fair use defense. Id. at 905. They found that Jardine
failed under both tests. Id.at 907-09. See C. J. Doellinger, Nominative FairUse ."
Jardineand the
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Even though the Lanham Act does not create a fair use defense for nominative
122
uses, the Ninth Circuit, in effect, created its own nominative fair use defense.
Such creation conflicts with the principle that where "Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion." 123 Federal courts do not have the authority to add
124
a provision to a federal statute that Congress chose to omit.

3. The Ninth CircuitFailedto Apply the Likelihood of Confusion FactorsFlexibly.
In Welles, the Ninth Circuit stated that the "three-factor test better evaluates
the likelihood of confusion in nominative use cases" than the Sleekeraft test, the
Ninth Circuit's multi-factor test precedent. 125 The court explained that "application
Demise of a Doctrine, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 5 (2003). According to Doellinger, "[f]ollowing
Jacrdine, the nominative fair use doctrine collapses," because in Jardine the Ninth Circuit said "the
third requirement of the nominative fair use defense-the lack of anything that suggests
sponsorship or endorsement-is merely the other side of the likelihood-of-confusion coin." Id. at
n.17. Also, "[s]ince the threshold issue, namely likelihood of confusion, is now the same in both tests
[Sleekeraft and nominative fair use], nominative fair use serves no function not already
encompassed under Sleekeraft." Id. at n. 18.
Yet there is a different burden of proof between the two tests, and the second nominative
fair use factor (Did defendant only use so much of the marks as was reasonably necessary to identify
the product or service?) does not necessarily relate to confusion, but can relate instead to some
concept of "fairness." Moreover, if the nominative fair use test is a substitute for the Sleekeraft test,
as Welles stated, see supra dicussion Part III.A.I, other elements normally considered for likelihood
of confusion would not be analyzed, leaving substantive differences between the two tests. On the
other hand, by taking into account both confusion as part of the third nominative fair use element in
Jardine and subsequent decisions, see infra discussion at Part III.D., the Ninth Circuit may be
moving toward a position on nominative use similar to that of the recent Fifth Circuit decision in
Century 21 discussed infra Part III.B. Even if the tests of the Ninth and Third Circuits are
becoming more alike, there remains a conflict between these two circuits and the remaining circuits.
These remaining circuits have neither switched any burden of proof to defendants in trademark
infringement claims involving nominative uses nor created a separate nominative fair use defense.
122 See BrotherRecords, Inc., 318 F.3d at 907.
123 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo,
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) and citing N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982)
and United States v. Naftalin, 44 1 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1979).
124 Cervantes-Ascencio v. U.S. I.N.S., 326 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 990
(2003) ("When construing statutes, we look to the statutory language which, if clear on its face, ends
our analysis. We presume that omissions of the sort at issue here are intentional, and we are
without authority, absent substantial evidence to the contrary, to 'add terms or provisions where
Congress has omitted them''); United States v. Watkins, 278 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) ("a court
should not read words into a statute that are not there"); Root v. New Liberty Hosp. Dist., 209 F.3d
1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Courts are obligated to refrain from embellishing statutes by inserting
language that Congress has opted to omit."); Trevan v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 69 F.3d 520, 526 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) ([W]e must enforce the statute as written and are not free to ignore a conscious choice by
Congress to permit."). Whether state courts should or could create a nominative fair use defense for
state law claims of unfair competition is beyond the scope of this article.
125 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002); AMF, Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351 (9th Cir. 1979).
In determining whether confusion between related goods is likely, the
following factors are relevant: 1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3.
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of the Sleekeraft test, which focuses on the similarity of the mark used by the
plaintiff and the defendant, would lead to the incorrect conclusion that virtually all
nominative uses are confusing." 12 6 In Sleekeraft, however, the Ninth Circuit said
that its list of eight factors to consider was "not exhaustive [because] other variables
may come into play depending on the particular facts presented." 127 The court in
Sleekeraft added that the similarity of marks "must be considered as they are
encountered in the marketplace."' 12 8
Using the earlier hypothetical, if Apple
Computers, Inc. advertises that APPLE computers work for 10 years but CHEAP
computers break down in the first year, will any consumer think that Apple
Computers, Inc. produces or supports Cheap Computers, Inc.? Moreover, in the same
year Welles was decided, the Ninth Circuit recognized that courts should not rigidly
assign weights to the various factors, and that the relative importance of the various
129
factors may vary from case to case.
This flexibility enables a trial judge or jury to address each of the Ninth Circuit's
three nominative fair use factors as part of the traditional multi-factor analysis when
evaluating the similarity of the marks, intent, marketing channels used, or as
additional factors to consider in a nominative use situation. 130 Put another way, each
of the three factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit for the nominative fair use defense
are factors reasonable to consider within the likelihood of confusion analysis rather
than separately.1 31 It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit has given no
explanation for their decision not to apply the more flexible eight Sleekeraft factors
132
flexibly.

4. Summary
The Ninth Circuit's formulation of the nominative fair use defense falls short on
three points. First, contrary to the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit created a fair use
defense as a substitute for the traditional likelihood of confusion test. Second,
contrary to the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit's fair use defense switches the burden
of proof to the defendant. Third, the Ninth Circuit did not demonstrate a practical

similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels
used; 6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; 7. defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of
expansion of the product lines.
Id. at 348-49.
126 PlayboyEnters., Inc., 279 F.3d at 801.
127 AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 348.
128 Id. at 351.
129 Thane Intern., Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
130 The New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992). In
Now Iads, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[c]ases like these are best understood as involving a
non-trademark use of a mark." Id. However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that trademarks serve as
source identifiers. Id. at 305. It seems clear that NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK identified a source, a
particular singing group, and did not itself describe the music that group sang (although of course
marks can conjure up a type of product or service, not by the regular meaning of the words used, but
by the association by the consumer of the words with the source).
131 PlayboyEnters., Inc., 279 F.3d at 801.
132 Id. at 801.
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need for a separate nominative fair use test when the court had the flexible
multifactor test at its disposal.

B. The Third Circuit Createsa Nominative FairUse Test That Gives Defendant the
Burden of Prooffor FairUse, Not Confusion.
In October 2005, the Third Circuit recognized a nominative fair use defense that
133
did not switch the burden of proof to the defendant on likelihood of confusion.
However, the Third Circuit did create a nominative fair use test as a supplement to
the traditional multi-factor test on likelihood of confusion, and held that the
defendant had the burden of proving that its nominative uses of the marks in
134
question were "fair uses."

1. The Factsand ProceedingsLeading to the Decision of the Third Circuitin Century
21 -Complementary Services
The Third Circuit addressed nominative fair use not in the context of
comparative advertising, but complementary services. 135 LendingTree is an Internet
business that helps consumers identify and select qualified lenders, real estate
brokers, auto insurers, and other financial service companies. As a practical matter,
LendingTree must identify the lenders, brokers, insurers, and financial service
companies, or LendingTree's services would be of no use to consumers. Therefore,
LendingTree included the names of some of these entities in advertisements, such as
1
Century 21, Coldwell Banker, and ERA. 36
133 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005). The docket
reflects that on December 27, 2005, the Third Circuit denied Century 21's petition for rehearing en
banc.
134 Id. at 224. (Stating that "Nominative fair use is said to occur when the alleged infringer
uses the [trademark holder's] product, even if the alleged infringer's ultimate goal is to describe his
own product).
135 By complementary products/services, this article means products or services that are used
with each other or which relate to each other. There seem to be two rules in tension with respect to
such products.
On on hand, confusion between marks is more likely where producers of
complementary products are involved. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280,
1291 (9th Cir. 1992); Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,
598 (5th Cir. 1985); 1 Plus Prod. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1008 (2d Cir. 1983). On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has said that in nominative use situations, where the defendant is
using the mark to describe both the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant has more reason to
use the mark of plaintiff. Cairns,292 F.3d at 1153-54. The resolution of this apparent tension is to
consider not simply the marks, but the use of the marks in context to determine likelihood of
confusion.
136 Century-21, 425 F.3d at 215. The alleged infringement here was based on the following uses
of CCE's marks:
(1) A Coldwell Banker "For Sale" sign with a woman, purporting to be a real
estate agent, next to it, on which the blue and white Coldwell Banker logo was
somewhat obscured by the word "SOLD." [LendingTree's] phone number was at
the bottom. This scene was depicted at the bottom of [LendingTree's] homepage
on
its
website.

[5:157 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

Century 21 and other entities named in the advertisements sued LendingTree
for trademark infringement. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, but
the Third Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings
under a new test. 137

2. The Majorityin Century 21 Applied the Multi-FactorTest Flexibly.
The Third Circuit majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit that a different test
was needed in the case of nominative fair use, but rejected the approach of the Ninth
Circuit. The Third Circuit majority held that when nominative fair use was raised,
the analysis would consist of two phases.
The first phase is a modified multi-factor test for likelihood of confusion in which
the plaintiff has the burden of proof for likelihood of confusion. In the Third Circuit,
courts traditionally have considered ten factors to determine if there is a likelihood of
confusion. 138 In Century 21, however, the Third Circuit concluded that some of these

(2) A statement by [LendingTree] on its "Find a Realtor" homepage stating that
[LendingTree] will "give you access to a national network of brokers representing
the country's leading real estate companies, including Coldwell Banker, ERA and
Century 21." These three names headed a bullet-pointed list of all such realtors to
whom LT promised access. The marks on those pages were in block letter format.
(3) [LendingTree's] statement on its website's Help Center that [LendingTree] is
"represented by large independent real estate companies and members of major
franchises - Coldwell Banker, Century 21, Prudential, ERA, ReMAX, GMAC
(formerly
Better
Homes
&
Gardens),
and
Realty
Executives."
(4) [LendingTree's] use of printed marketing materials that stated that
"[LendingTree] is affiliated with more than 700 certified brokers such as Coldwell
Banker, Century 21, Prudential, ERA and RE/MAX."
Id. at 215-16. Subsequent to the initiation of the litigation, LendingTree changed the background
color of the For Sale sign (first bullet point above) from blue to red, removed the phone number,
changed the location of some text and added the following disclaimer: "LendingTree is not
sponsored by or affiliated with the parent franchisor companies of any of the participating members
of its network." [d.at 216.
1:7Id. at 216, 232. A defendant can argue that only using the name of a company is not using a
trademark but only the company's trade name. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 defines "trade name" as 'any name
used by a person to identify his or her business or vocation." Under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000),.
"trademark' refers to words and symbols that identify and distinguish the mark holder's goods from
those manufactured or sold by others. Martahus v. Video Duplication Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 421
(Fed. Cir. 1993). Although in general trade names cannot be registered as mark, companies can
register their trade names or trade marks if they also serve as trademarks. In fact, Apple
Computers, Inc. has registered APPLE COMPUTER, INC. (disclaiming the exclusive right to use
"Computer, Inc." apart from the remainder of the mark. U.S. Trademark No. 2273661 (filed
December 4, 1997). However even if a trade name is not registered, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (§ 43(a) of
the Lanham Act) protects trade names, not just trademarks. See Accuride Intern., Inc. v. Accuride
Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir. 1989) ("analogous actions for trade name infringement can be
brought under section 43(a)" of the Lanham Act); Walt-West Enter., Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc., 695
F.2d 1050, 1054, n.5 ("an action for trade name infringement is nonetheless proper under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)"); Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir.
1980). See also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 9:1, 9:4 (4th ed. 2005). ("Protection against the confusing use of commercial and corporate names
is afforded upon the same basic principles as apply to trademarks in general.").
138 Century21, 425 F.3d at 224. The ten factors are as follows:
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factors were unworkable or otherwise not suited as indicators of confusion in the case
at hand, and that some of the factors "applied mechanically would inevitably point
toward the likelihood of confusion where no likelihood of confusion may actually
exist." 139 For instance, the Third Circuit stated that the first factor in the multifactor test, similarity of the two marks-"does not leave any room for the
consideration of the context of the use-i.e., that the mark is being used to describe
140
the plaintiffs own product."
Yet the Third Circuit created its multi-factor test, and could have made the first
factor more flexible-to consider the context of the use of the mark. For instance, if
Cheap Computers, Inc. refers to Apple Computers, Inc. in an advertisement as a
means of comparison of products, Cheap Computers could be using both its mark,
CHEAP COMPUTERS, and also the exact mark of its competitor, APPLE
COMPUTERS, but would anyone be confused? The issue in Century 21 was more
complex than such comparative advertising, however, because generally in
comparative advertising the named companies or marks clearly compete. In Century
21, the other named companies were not competitors, and the consumer might have
concluded the named entities agreed to LendingTree's use of their marks.
Based on the Supreme Court's decision in KP Permanent, the Third Circuit
concluded the burden of proving likelihood of confusion must remain with the
plaintiff. The majority determined that out of the traditional ten factors, there were
four relevant factors to consider on likelihood of confusion:
(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care
141
and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase;
(2) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without
142
evidence of actual confusion;
(3) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 143 and

(1) degree of similarity between the two marks; (2) strength of owner's mark; (3) care
and attention used by consumers when making a purchase of product or service in
question; (4) length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual
confusion; (5) intent of defendant in adopting the mark; (6) evidence of actual confusion;
(7) whether the goods or services are marketed through the same channels of trade;
(8) extent to which the products or services are the same; (9) the relationship between the
goods or services in the mind of consumers because of the similarity of function; and
(10) factors suggesting that the public might expect the owner to expand into the market of
the defendant. Id. See also Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1978)
(indicating that the Third Circuit refers to these ten factors as the Lapp factors).
139 Century21, 425 F.3d at 224.
140

Id. at 225.

'I Id.at 226.
142
143

Id. at 227.
Id. The court explained the issue of intent as follows: "The relevant question in this context

is not whether the defendant intended to use the plaintiffs mark, which it always has in a fair use
case, but whether it used the mark with the intent to confuse the public as to the relationship
between the defendant and the plaintiff." Id. The majority said there were "myriad factors" that a
plaintiff might point to on the issue of intent, including "a defendant's persistence in adopting a
mark despite being warned of potential confusion." Id. Presumably a factor which could show bad
intent is using more of the mark than is needed or failure to have a disclaimer about affiliation,
which alternatively could be considered under "similarity of marks", if the context of the ads were
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(4) the evidence of actual confusion. 144
The majority, however, stated that a district court might consider more of the 10
factors in other nominative fair use cases to determine likelihood of confusion, but
only four were relevant to the facts of Century 21.145 Notably, the majority in
Century 21 created an affirmative defense for the second phase of the new test.

3. The Third Circuit'sNew Nominative FairUse Test
The majority in Century 21 decided that once a plaintiff met its burden of
proving that confusion was likely, the burden ofproofshifted to the defendant, not to
negate confusion, but to show that the defendant's nominative use of the plaintiffs
mark was a fair use. The majority stated that a "nominative use defendant need only
prove fairness and is not required to negate confusion." 146 Yet, in KP Permanentthe
Supreme Court based its conclusion on the availability of a fair use defense created
by statute, 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4).147 In Century 21, there was no statute on which
148
the majority could base its decision.
The majority concluded that three questions should be asked on the issue of
nominative fair use:
(1) is the use of plaintiffs mark necessary to describe
(a) plaintiffs product or service and (b) defendant's product or
service?
(2) is only so much of the plaintiffs mark used as is necessary to
describe plaintiffs product or services?
(3) does the defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and
accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendant's product or
149
services?
taken into account. Responding to Judge Fisher's concurring/dissenting opinion that the majority's
fair use defense created a duplicative inquiry into intent, the majority responded that the
tests for confusion and fairness are not duplicative, however, because a plaintiff can
also establish likelihood of confusion through seven other Lapp factors besides intent.
It is the circumstance in which a court does not find bad intent but does find
confusion that a nominative fair use defense will be most useful.
Id. at 227 n.7. Of course, the fact a defense may be useful does not mean the Lanham Act authorizes
that defense.
Ml Century21, 425 F.3d at 225-26.
145 Id. at 225. "We find that all of the other Lapp factors, while perhaps not appropriate for
analysis in this particular case, could be analyzed in future nominative use cases, depending on the
factual situation." Id. at 225.
146 Id. at 223 n.3.
147 KIP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004).
18 Id. at 119. KP Permanentwas not applicable authority, since it involved classic/descriptive
fair use, not nominative fair use.
149 Century21, 425 F.3d at 228. This first prong of the majority's test is different than the first
prong of the Ninth Circuit's test, which only considers whether use of plaintiffs mark is necessary to
describe plaintiffs products or services. The majority in Century 21 noted that the Ninth Circuit
considered the needs of defendant in its second prong. Id. at 229 n.9. However, the majority in
Century 21 asked, "[W]hile it should be asked whether plaintiffs product needs to be described by
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The majority added, however, that it did not actually mean "necessary" in
connection with the first test. 150 Instead, it noted that a "court need only be satisfied
that the identification by the defendant of plaintiffs product or service would be
151
rendered significantly more difficult without use of the mark."
The majority indicated that the third factor of the Ninth Circuit test asked
"whether the user did anything that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." 152 The majority, however,
thought that a slightly different question was more appropriate:
"Does the
defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between
plaintiff and defendant's products or services?" 153
The majority explained,
"sometimes a plaintiffs relationship with defendant may be one of endorsement, but
the nature of the endorsement as reflected by defendant's employment of plaintiffs
154
mark may not be accurate."

4. The Concurrenceand Dissentin Century 21
In Century 21, Judge Fisher concurred, stating that the burden of proof for
likelihood of confusion must remain with the plaintiff and that the case should be
155
remanded to the district court for a new analysis on likelihood of confusion.
However, Judge Fisher dissented from the majority on the bifurcated analysis of the
majority: "The majority.., errs in treating its test as an affirmative defense because
that defense, even as modified, analyzes nothing more than core issues of likelihood
of confusion, issues that are within the purview of plaintiffs case." 156 He argued that

because the second phase of the nominative fair use test analyzed elements of
likelihood of confusion, this test effectively and improperly switched the burden of
157
proof to the defendant.
Because prior cases analyzed nominative uses without resorting to a separate
test that placed the burden on defendants, Judge Fisher indicated a separate test
was unnecessary. 158 He quoted Justice Holmes for the applicable test: "When the
mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public, we do not see such sanctity in
the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth." 159 Additionally, Judge Fisher
reference to its mark, should it not also, be examined whether defendant's use of it, at all, is
necessary to accurately describe what defendant does or sells, or whether its reference to plaintiffs
mark is actually gratuitous." Id. at 229.
150 Id. at 229.
151

152
153

Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 228.

151 Id. at 230-31. On remand, the majority said the district court "should consider whether the
disclaimer [provided by LendingTree on its web site] was an affirmative action by [Lending Tree]
that effectively negated an inaccurate implication of sponsorship or endorsement... " Id. at 231.
'55

Id. at 232.

156 Id. at 236 n.13.
157 Id. at 223. (indicating that Judge Fisher also argued that the majority's "test is judicially
unmanageable, because it requires courts to examine identical likelihood of confusion factors on both
sides of the analysis.").
158 Id. at 236.
159 Id. at 237 (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)).
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added that "Prestonettesis clearly a nominative use case, and the Supreme Court did
160
not treat the use as one that had to be justified by the defendant."
Judge Fisher went on, "[tihe panel is unanimous in holding that in an
appropriate case, all but the first two ... factors may be relevant to the nominative
use analysis." 161 It is not clear why he thought the "similarity of marks" factor could
not take into account the context of the marks, since other circuits have indicated
courts should take into account context of use. 162 Judge Fisher did recognize that
competitors often make nominative use of other companies' marks for purpose of
comparison and criticism, and, in such context, the consumer is unlikely to believe
163
the mark of the competitor is similar to the mark of the advertiser.
He continued by stating "descriptive fair use and nominative use are very
different animals: in descriptive fair use, the key inquiry is whether a plaintiffs
mark is being used in a descriptive sense, but in nominative use cases, courts ask one
question alone: is the defendant's use likely to confuse?" 164 In KP Permanent,the
Supreme Court indicated that the statutory defense may not limit the parties to the
issue of whether or not defendant used the mark in a descriptive sense. 165 The Court
added that "the proceedings in this case so far raise no occasion to evaluate some
other concerns that courts might pick as relevant, quite apart from attention to
confusion." 166 This indication that other considerations could be issues to consider in
160 Id. at 237.
161 Id. at 239 n.18 (similarity of the marks and strength of the marks.).
162 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 458 (2d Cir. 2004) ([I]mpression'

created by the

setting in which the mark is used is often of critical importance") (quoting Spring Mills, Inc. v.
Ultracashmere House Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 2004)); Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith,
279 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) ('(1) Marks should be considered in their entirety and as they
appear in the marketplace; (2) Similarity is best adjudged by, appearance, sound, and meaning");
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) ('[A]
court should not consider 'how closely a fragment of a given use duplicates the trademarks', but
must instead consider 'whether the use in its entirety creates a likelihood of confusion') (quoting
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 319 (4th Cir), cert. denied 506 U.S. 872
(1992); Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1998) ([W]e consider
the marks as they are encountered by the consumer in the marketplace")). Cf Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225 (3d Cir. 2005) (similarity of the marks "does not
leave any room for the context of the use - i.e., that the mark is being used to describe the plaintiffs
own product.").
163 Century 21 425 F.3d. at 239. Judge Fisher said that four factors the majority seemed to
reject in Century 21 could in fact be relevant on remand: (1) whether the goods are marketed
through the same channels of trade; (2) the extent to which the consumers of the products are the
same; (3) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of the similarity of
function; and (4) other factors suggesting that the consuming public might expect the owner to
manufacture a product in the defendant's market or to expand into that market. Id. at 239 n.18,
247-49. Judge Fisher said that although "the majority expresses doubt regarding the weight of the
last four Lapp factors to this particular dispute ....
at no point does it hold that the District Court
is prohibited from considering them." Id. at 239 n.18, 246-47.
104 Id. at 245-46.
165 KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123 (2004) (The Court
said "our holding that fair use can occur along with some degree of confusion does not foreclose the
relevance of the extent of any likely consumer confusion in assessing whether a defendant's use is
objectively fair.").
166 Id. (The Court said "we likewise do not pass upon the position of the United States, as
amicus, that the 'used fairly' requirement in § 1115(b)(4) demands only that the descriptive term
describe the goods accurately.").
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determining whether a defendant was fairly using a mark in its descriptive sense
does not mean that these issues should have been relevant to the outcome in Century
21, which did not involve 15 U.S.C. § 1115.
Although the majority in Century 21 recognized the difference between
descriptive fair use and nominative fair use, the majority questioned "why we should
ask radically different questions when analyzing a defendant's ability to refer to a
plaintiffs mark in the two contexts." 167 The clear answer to this question is that
Congress established a fair use defense in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) for a defendant to
describe its own product, but has not provided the same defense in the event of use
by a defendant of a third party's mark to identify the third party's product.
The majority argued that confusion and fairness were distinct issues and courts
should apply KP Permanentto nominative fair use and consider both confusion and
fairness in nominative use situations. 168 Although the majority appears to be correct
that KP Permanentshows that fair use is distinct from likelihood of confusion, there
is still no statutory authority for an affirmative defense of fairness for nominative
uses.169

5. Summary
In recognition of the decision in KP Permanentthat plaintiff has the burden of
proof for likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement case, the majority in
107 Century21, 425 F.3d at 223.

16 Id. at 222-24.
1 9 Whether Century 21 had a valid claim for false advertising is beyond the scope of this

article, but it is worth noting that false advertising claims may overlap with false designation of
origin claims. While prior to 1989 both claims would have been based on the same words in § 43(a),
effective in 1989, Congress split the claims into two subsections, now § 43(a)(1)(A) and § 43(a)(1)(B).
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 27:09-27:10
(4th ed. 2005). Subsection (A) refers to a representation which "is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to oriin,sponsaorship,or approvalof-his or he: goods, services or commercial activities
by another person" (trademark infringement) (emphasis added).
Subsection (B) refers to a
representation which "in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristic, qualities or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities" (false advertising) (Emphasis added). The elements of the two types of claims
are distinct. Compare Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharms, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994) and 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:24 (4th ed. 2005) (false advertising) with Fisons
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1994) and 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:13 (4th ed. 2005)
(trademark infringement). However, if a plaintiff cannot show it has a protectable unregistered
mark, it could nevertheless have a claim under subsection (B) for false advertising. If a plaintiff can
prove that an ad was literally false, it does not have to prove that the ad mislead any consumer in
order to prove false advertising. Johnson & Johnson--Merck, 19 F.3d at 129. If a plaintiff does
have a protectible mark, the plaintiff could have both a false advertising claim and a trademark
infringement claim for the same advertisement. For instance, advertisements that the products of
Cheap Computers, Inc. are compatible with APPLE products could result in both claims. See, e.g.,
Creative Labs, Inc. v. Cyrix Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872 (N.D. Calif. 1997); 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1778 (N.D.
Calif. 1997), affd 141 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1998); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:5 1.1.
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Century 21 technically did not switch the burden of proof for likelihood of confusion
to the defendant. However, the court did create a separate defense not authorized by
statute, and held that the defendant had the burden of proof to show "fair use." This
reasoning was contrary to Judge Fisher's argument that the "fair use elements" were
really likelihood of confusion elements and that the majority decision actually
170
switched the burden of proof for no likelihood of confusion to the defendant.
Judge Fisher was correct in his opposition to a separate nominative fair use test,
but he failed to address practical questions about possible consequences of not
adopting a separate nominative fair use test. For instance, wouldn't a defendant be
more able than a plaintiff to produce evidence that: (1)a prohibition on defendant's
use of plaintiffs mark would make it significantly more difficult for defendant to
discuss plaintiffs products; and (2) defendant's conduct and language-such as the
use of disclaimers-reflected the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and
defendant's products or services? If so, shouldn't the courts place some burden on
defendants in the nominative use situation?
The next section addresses the decision of the Fifth Circuit to adopt a
nominative "fair use" supplement to the traditional multi-factor test that avoids some
of the problems resulting from the approaches of the Ninth and Third Circuits.

C. The Fifth Circuit Createsa Nominative FairUse Test As a Supplement to the
TraditionalMulti-FactorTest Without Deciding the Procedure.

1. The Decision of the Fifth Circuitin Pebble Beach
Pebble Beach Co. owned the nationally known Pebble Beach golf course in
California and sued Tour 18 I, Ltd. for trademark infringement at Tour 18's golf
course in Humble, Texas. 171 The Humble public golf course had a collection of 16
replica golf holes from famous golf courses, including Pebble Beach.17 2 Among other
things, Tour 18 identified the golf holes that it had copied by using the trademarks of
the courses in question.17 3 Tour 18 included disclaimers on the course and in some
promotional material that the original golf courses were not affiliated with Tour
18.174 Considering the service mark infringement claim filed by Pebble Beach, the
district court found there was a likelihood of confusion and entered judgment for
175
Pebble Beach.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but treated nominative fair use differently than the
Ninth Circuit. First, the Fifth Circuit stated "we cannot say that the district court
committed clear error in finding actual confusion and in finding a likelihood of

Century21, 425 F.3d at 246.
Id. at 533.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 535.
170
171

174
175

Id.
Id.at 535.
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confusion." 176
Then the court turned to the nominative fair use defense,
acknowledged that courts "have long recognized that one who lawfully copies
another's product can appropriately tell the public what he has copied", and added
that it is appropriate for one company to use the mark of a second company to
truthfully identify the second company's goods or services in order to describe or
177
compare the product or services.
The Fifth Circuit adopted two elements from the nominative fair use defense set
forth in New Kid: a "defendant (1) may only use so much of the mark as necessary
to identify the product or service and (2) may not do anything that suggests
affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by the mark holder." 178 The Fifth Circuit
stated it would not impose the first requirement of New Kids, that the product or
service in question must not be readily identifiable without use of the trademark,
because in the context of direct comparative advertising, this requirement would
179
always be satisfied.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit used the two nominative fair
use factors as a supplement to the traditional multi-factor test rather than as a
substitute. The Fifth Circuit explained that "a court is not limited to considering
only the standard digits of confusion."180 The court added that "the traditional
likelihood of confusion analyses is applicable in a comparative-advertising situation,
but the court should usually consider the nominative-use claim in conjunction with
its likelihood of confusion analysis to avoid lowering the standard of confusion."181 In
other words, the Fifth Circuit flexibly used the two nominative fair use factors as a
part of the traditional multi-factor test.182
The Fifth Circuit did not conclude whether or not consideration of the two
mentioned nominative fair use factors switched any burden to the defendant.
Instead, the court appeared to defer that question for another case, saying, "[w]e do
not prescribe any particular method for this consideration because this case does not
present a situation in which nominative use is a significant factor in the liability
18 3

determination."
176

Id. at 545.

Id. The reference to "lawfully copies" eliminates the possibility that copyright law protected
what defendant copied.
178 Id.at 546.
179 Id. at 546 n.13. It is not clear if the Fifth Circuit was suggesting that in nominative fair use
cases that did not involve direct comparative advertising, the first factor from the Ninth Circuit's
test would be applied.
180Id. at 546.
181Id.at 547.
182 Mark A. Thurman, Recent Developments in TrademarkLaw, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 179,
189-90, ("[In Pebble Beach] Defendant had used plaintiffs word marks in a variety of contexts,
many of which could not be justified under this nominative use theory, and such uses were
enjoined."). The Fifth Circuit did refer to the nominative use as use by a defendant of the mark of
plaintiff simply to identify the plaintiff, not to imply defendant was affiliated with the plaintiff.
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit in fact based
its decision on the traditional likelihood of confusion test, flexibly applied, concluding "Tour 18 has
used the marks in ways suggesting affiliation, sponsorship, or approval." Id. The court added,
"Because Tour 18 used the Plaintiffs' marks in more than merely nominative sense, a different
approach would not have altered the result." Id. at 547. The different approach, that the Fifth
Circuit did not use, was a separate nominative fair use defense.
183 Id.at 547 n.14.
177
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2. Summary
The Fifth Circuit decision on the issues presented to it in the Pebble Beach
makes sense. The Fifth Circuit did not create a nominative use defense to replace
the multi-factor test, and instead used the multi-factor test flexibly to address the
special circumstances presented by nominative fair use-not similarity between
marks, but rather likelihood of confusion about an affiliation between the plaintiff
and defendant. Also, because the court did not create a separate defense, the burden
of proof for likelihood of confusion remains with the plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit.
The facts in Pebble Beach, however, show why it makes sense not to keep all
responsibility on the plaintiff. A significant issue in Pebble Beach was the use of
disclaimers by Tour 18. The Fifth Circuit noted the following disclaimers were on the
scorecards and yardage guides: "The design of this course was inspired by great holes
from 16 different golf courses. None of the courses endorse, sponsor, or are affiliated
with Tour 18."184
However, the Fifth Circuit also noted that "several advertisements and
promotional materials do not contain any disclaimers."1 85 The court concluded that
"Tour 18 has used the marks in images suggesting affiliation, sponsorship, or
186
approval."
In a nominative use case, the issues are more likely to include a wider range of
actions by the defendant than simply the using of a mark because of the question:
Did defendant take any action that might lead the consumer to believe defendant and
plaintiff were affiliated? Furthermore, information on this wider range of actions
may be easier for defendant to obtain than plaintiff. In fact, as part E of the next
section shows, the burden of production may need to switch to the defendant to show
that no actions were taken to confuse consumers, without switching the ultimate
burden of persuasion to the defendant.

III. COURTS Do NOT NEED A SEPARATE NOMINATIVE FAIR USE DEFENSE

There are numerous examples of courts examining nominative uses in
trademark infringement cases without resorting to a separate nominative fair use
defense. 1 87 This section discusses some of these cases to show that there is no need
for a separate nominative fair use test. The section closes by showing that although
there is no need for a separate test, switching the burden of production for likelihood
of confusion, but not the burden of proof, may be helpful in nominative use cases.

184
185

186
187

Id. at 535. The same or similar disclaimers were on signs at each golf tee box. Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
See e.g., PACCAR, Inc. v. Telescan Tech. LLC, 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003);

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969); Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns
Int'l., Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 WL 464688 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005).
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A. Defendant's Use of PlaintiffsProducts or Serviees-ComplementaryProductsor
Serviees
1. PACCAR
Unlike the Third Circuit in Century 21, the Sixth Circuit recently ruled on a
trademark infringement claim involving nominative use without adopting a separate
nominative use defense. 188 Plaintiff PACCAR manufactured heavy trucks and truck
parts under the trademarks PETERBILT and KENWORTH, and also administered a
used truck locator service on its web site, www.paccar.com. 189 Defendant TeleScan
owned several web sites providing truck locator services that contained a database of
dealers selling different types of new and used trucks, including Peterbilt and
Kenworth trucks. 190 TeleScan also had manufacturer specific websites, including the
domain names www.peterbiltnewtrucks.com and www.kenworthnewtrucks.com, and
displayed PACCAR's "marks in the wallpaper underlying the manufacturer-specific
web sites in fonts
similar
to the
distinctive
fonts
in PACCAR's
trademarks ... and ... in the site's metatags."191
Defendant argued its use of the marks was a nominative fair use, but the Sixth
Circuit declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 192 However, the Sixth Circuit
analyzed the situation using both the traditional multi-factor test and nominative
fair use test, and found trademark infringement under either analysis. 193 The Sixth
Circuit cited the same factors as being determinative in its nominative fair use
analysis as it considered determinative in the multi-factor test.194
In support of its nominative fair use defense, TeleScan argued that using
PACCAR's trademarks was the only way to describe the products being marketed
through TeleScan's web pages. 195 The Sixth Circuit explained the argument could
have had merit if TeleScan limited its use of the marks to the words on its web sites,
but noted that "TeleScan ... included PACCAR's trademarks in its domain names,
thereby describing its own products-its web sites." 196 The Sixth Circuit also noted
TeleScan would not satisfy the nominative fair use defense because "repeating the
188

PACCAR, 319 F.3d 243.

189Id. at 247.
190 Id.

191 Id. at 247-48.
192 Id. at 256. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument of defendant that its use of the marks
satisfied the classic/descriptive fair use defense, because the Sixth Circuit concluded that
defendant's use of the marks in its domain name confused consumers over the source of the
products-as a mark-and did not describe the products. Id. at 250-51, 255.
193 Id. at 257-58.
194

Id. at 256.
Using PACCAR's trademarks in its domain names, repeating the marks in
the main titles of the web sites and in the wallpaper underlying the web sites, and
mimicking the distinctive fonts of the marks go beyond using the marks "as is
reasonably necessary to identify" PACCAR's trucks, parts, and dealers. As
discussed above, TeleScan's use of PACCAR's trademarks in its domain names
creates a likelihood of confusion as to whether its web sites are affiliated with
PACCAR.

Id.
195

Id. at 256.

196 Id.
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marks in the main titles of the web sites and in the wallpaper underlying the web
sites, and mimicking the distinctive fonts of the marks, go beyond using the marks
'as is reasonably necessary to identify' PACCAR's trucks, parts, and dealers." 197 In
short, there was no need for a separate nominative fair use defense in PACCAR
because the Sixth Circuit considered all the nominative fair use factors in applying
198
the multi-factor test.

2. Volkswagenwerk
Even the Ninth Circuit has analyzed trademark infringement claims involving
nominative uses of marks without employing a separate nominative fair use defense.
For instance, in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellsehaft v. Chureh, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the right of a Volkswagen repair serviceman to advertise his business as
servicing Volkswagens.1 99 The court explained that "Church's prominent use of the
word 'independent' whenever the terms "Volkswagen" or "VW" appeared in his
advertising was sufficient to distinguish his business in the eye of the customer
exercising the care, caution, and power of perception that the public may be expected
to exercise." 200 In addition, the Ninth Circuit cited the fact that Church did not use
Volkswagen's distinctive lettering style or color scheme, nor did he display the
encircled VW emblem in his advertisements. 20 1 Without resorting to a separate
nominative fair use defense, the Ninth Circuit in Volkswagenwerk stated the basic
principal: if "another uses the marks in a manner which tends to deceive the public,
[the plaintiff] is entitled to protection." 20 2 Put simply, one company's use of another
company's mark can be analyzed adequately under a likelihood of confusion test203
without creating a separate test.

197Id.

The Sixth Circuit prefaced its multi-factor analysis by stating that courts should apply the
test not with mathematical precision and not by counting who won on most of the factors, but should
apply the factors to determine the question "whether ultimate consumers are likely to believe that
the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way." PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 250
(quoting Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Center, 109 F.3d 275, 280
(6th Cir. 1997)). Under the factor "marketing channels," the Sixth Circuit concluded Telescan's use
of a disclaimer of affiliation on its web site was too late to prevent likelihood of confusion resulting
from reviewing the domain names. Id. at 253. Since a disclaimer is not really a marketing channel,
but evidence of how a marketing channel is used, the Sixth Circuit's consideration of the disclaimer
shows how flexible the multi-factor test can be in considering nominative use fact patterns.
199 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 351 (9th Cir. 1969).
200 Id.at 352.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 352.
203 Cf Bijur Lubricating Corp. v. Devco Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 722, 727-34
(D.N.J. 2004)
(applying the traditional likelihood of confusion multi-factor test for the claim of trademark
infringement and the Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use defense to the claim of trademark
dilution).
198

[5:157 2006]

Use of a Competing Mark in Advertising

3. Ty
Another case considering complementary products was T, Inc. v. Publications
International,Ltd., in which the maker of Beanie Babies toys sued a publisher of a
series of books and magazines designed to be collectors' guides for Beanie Baby
products.20 4 The court recognized that the nominative fair use defense extended to
the situation in Ty where defendant used the plaintiffs mark to identify not just a
source of plaintiffs products, but to identify both the plaintiffs and defendant's
products.20 5
The court decided that such dual reference was "presumptively
confusing," 20 6 and added, "[a]bsent other information, [defendant's] use of Ty's mark
is inherently, almost inescapably confusing: standing alone, a consumer cannot tell
whether [Publications's] product is sponsored by, endorsed by or affiliated with
Ty."207 The court explained the nominative fair use test "assumes the likelihood of
confusion, and notwithstanding that confusion, provides an opportunity to determine
208
whether the defendant's use of the mark infringes or can be defended as 'fair use."'
The court referred to such presumption and assumption of likelihood of confusion
even though on the front cover of every book there appeared the following disclaimer:
"This publication is not authorized or licensed by Ty, Inc. Publications International
20 9
Ltd. is not affiliated with Ty, Inc."
Citing KP Permanent,the district court stated that the "common law of unfair
competition support[s] the premise that fair use can occur along with some degree of
confusion." 210 In KP Permanent, however, the Supreme Court considered the
common law treatment of descriptive fair use, not nominative use. 211 The existence
of a common law fair use defense to a common law claim of trademark infringement
does not justify the application of such a defense to a federal statutory claim under
the Lanham Act, where Congress has presumptively excluded application to
nominative uses by only adopting such defense in different parts of the Lanham Act
212
for other situations.

Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l., Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 WL 464688, *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005).
Id. at *5. Both to the original products of Ty, BEANIE BABIES and, in part, to the books of
defendant about BEANIE BABIES. Id. In cases of comparative advertising, by contrast, use of a
competitor's mark only refers directly to the competitor. However, the comparison of the products
does at least indirectly serve to inform the public about the product of the advertiser.
206 Id.
204
205

207

Id.

208 Id. at *6 (Emphasis added).

209 See id. at *9, *10; Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l., Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2000 WL 1499449, *3 (N.D.
Ill. 2000), rev'd, 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,537 U.S. 1110 (2003).'
210 Ty, Inc., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 WL 464688 at *6.
211 KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123 (2004) ("[T]he
common law of unfair competition also tolerated some degree of confusion from a descriptive use of
words contained in another person's trademark").
212 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C § 1114 (2000) creates the cause of action for infringement of
registered marks.
15 U.S.C § 1125 (2000) creates the cause of action for infringement of
unregistered marks and for dilution of famous trademarks. 15 U.S.C § 1115 (2000) creates the
descriptive fair use defense, and 15 U.S.C § 1125 (2000) creates the fair use defense to dilution of
famous trademarks. "Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
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The court in Ty presumed likelihood of confusion, despite finding that the
disclaimer, referred to above, "satisfied the third prong of the nominative fair use
defense"-that defendant had not suggested plaintiff sponsored or endorsed the
product.2 13 Because there was a question of fact about whether Publications used
more of plaintiffs mark than was necessary-the second element of the nominative
214
fair use test-the court denied Publications's motion for summary judgment.
The decision in Ty shows the importance of which nominative fair use test a
court applies. Because of the conspicuous disclaimer that appeared to eliminate any
suggestion of affiliation or sponsorship, a court in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits would
probably have granted Publications's motion for summary judgment.215 However,
applying the Ninth Circuit's nominative fair use defense, the court denied
Publications's motion for summary judgment because there was a question of fact
216
about whether it was "fair" that Publications had used the mark as much as it had.

4. Summary

The foregoing cases support the argument that a separate nominative fair use
test is unnecessary in evaluating likelihood of confusion. The decision in Ty might
suggest that there is a need for a separate nominative fair use defense to consider the
issue of "fairness," but then one must ask: what is the basis for a court to add a
separate fairness test when Congress did not see fit to provide one for trademark
infringement claims pertaining to nominative uses?

(1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972));

see also K!P

Permanent,543 U.S. at 118 (quoting Russelo, 464 U.S. at 23).
Ty, Inc., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 WL 464688 at *10.
Id. at *9. This second element may be distinct from a likelihood of confusion. For instance,
no matter how many times a defendant uses a competitor's mark, if the use does not suggest
affiliation or sponsorship, it seems unlikely there could be confusion. On the other hand, the second
element of the nominative fair use test could be evidence of intent to confuse, and, as indicated
supra, Part III.A.1., some courts have analyzed the intent element of the traditional multi-factor
test in this manner. However, to the extent how extensively a defendant has used a mark is
inserted as part of a separate defense, it seems likely to focus attention on some abstract concept of
"fairness" rather than likelihood of confusion, thus altering the result in certain cases.
215 The mere use of a disclaimer by defendant or the use of defendant's mark with the mark of
a plaintiff may not be enough for a court to find no likelihood of confusion, but courts should
consider the effect such disclaimers and uses of two marks may have on the likelihood of confusion.
Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1566-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1078 (1995); Arrow Fastener Co. Inc. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 394-96 (2d Cir. 1995); Am.
Legion v. Matthew, 144 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir. 1998); Auto Zone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786,
796-97 (6th Cir. 2004), cf Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th
Cir. 1992); Int'l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092-93 (7th Cir.
1988); Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999) (specific disclaimers or
use of defendant's mark insufficient to avoid confusion). Since the court in Ty held that under the
third element of the nominative fair use test defendant had taken no steps to suggest affiliation, it is
difficult to see how a court-just looking at likelihood of confusion-could have denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment.
216 Ty, Inc., No. 99 C 5655, 2005 WL 464688 at *8. The court did grant defendant's motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs common law claim of infringement, not on the issue of likelihood of
confusion, but because Ty did not have the common law rights it claimed. Id. at *4 n.4.
213

214
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B. ComparativeAdvertising
Courts recognize companies may use the trademarks of competitors in
comparative advertising in many situations. 21 7 For instance, in SSP Agricultural
Equipment, Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., the Ninth Circuit agreed that the defendant's
use of the plaintiffs trademark TROPIC BREEZE for purposes of comparing the
plaintiffs wind machines with the defendant's wind machines, marketed under the
trademark ORCHARD-RITE, did not constitute trademark infringement. 21 8 The
Ninth Circuit noted that the district court found "sellers of wind machines were well
known to potential purchasers in the area where Orchard-Rite's advertisement was
distributed and there was no likelihood that they would be confused as to the source
or identity of Orchard-Rite's product." 219 The Ninth Circuit did not find it necessary
to use a separate nominative fair use test to reach the conclusion that there was no
trademark infringement, even though the defendant had been using its competitor's
22 0
mark to indicate the source of the plaintiffs products.
Similarly, the Third Circuit did not need a separate nominative fair use test in
G. D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson PharmaceuticalCorp.,221 a case involving a comparison
of laxatives. Hudson characterized its product as "equivalent to METAMUCIL,"
222
identifying the source of a competitor's product by use of the competitor's mark.
The Third Circuit noted "[wihen the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the
public, we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the
truth."223 However, because of the overall similarity in packaging, the "eye-catching

display of the METAMUCIL mark," and "the absence of any reference to Searle's
ownership rights in its trademark," the district court concluded there was "a
substantial likelihood that consumers will be confused and will purchase
REGACILIUM thinking they are buying a cheaper version of the product from the

217 In fact, the Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a regulation acknowledging the
benefits of truthful comparative advertising:
"Comparative advertising, when truthful and
nondeceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and assists them in making
rational purchase decisions.
Comparative advertising encourages product improvement and
innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the marketplace." 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c) (2005). See also 4
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:52 (4th ed.

2005).
218

SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1979).

Id. at 1103.
220 Id. at 1102-03.
219
221

G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1983).

222

Id. at 842.

22: Id. at 843.
Quoting earlier cases, the Third Circuit added that "collateral and truthful
references to the trademark of another are permissible as long as the 'unauthorized' reference does
not cause confusion as to the source of the product advertised." Id. at 841 n.9; see also Bally Total
Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F.Supp.2d 1161 (C.D. Calif.1998) (web page/domain name of
"Bally sucks" did not constitute trademark infringement under multi-factor test); Sw. Recreational
Indus., Inc. v. FieldTurf, Inc., No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 32783971 at *8 n.39 (5th Cir. 2002) (although
the court referred to a nominative use of plaintiffs mark, it said that apart from certain false and
misleading statements about plaintiff on defendant's website, "the present claim concerns the
separate question of whether Fieldturfs use of the Astro Turf trademark created a likelihood of
confusion as to the source of information on Fieldturf s website").
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same company that manufactures METAMUCIL." 224 The Third Circuit affirmed,
225
and neither court needed a separate nominative fair use test to reach the outcome.

C. Parodies
Because the Lanham Act regulates false or misleading commercial speech,
traditional trademark infringement claims do not run afoul of the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of speech and freedom of press. 2 2 6

As the Ninth Circuit

explained, "[w]hatever first amendment rights you may have in calling the brew you
make in your bathtub 'Pepsi' are easily outweighed by the buyer's interest in not
being fooled into buying it."227 Parodies, however, can raise both nominative use and
First Amendment freedom of speech issues. In cases where First Amendment
considerations were more prominent, the failure to use a nominative use analysis
might have been the result of First Amendment considerations and not the adequacy
228
of the traditional multi-factor analysis for likelihood of confusion.
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises,P.
v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the preliminary injunction prohibiting Penguin Books from publishing "The
Cat NOT in the Hat!", a satire on the O.J. Simpson trial that used a variety of Dr.
Seuss trademarks. 229 The Ninth Circuit explained that "parody" was not a separate
defense, "but merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are

224
225

226

Searle,715 F.2d at 839.
Id. at 841.
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The Lanham Act is

constitutional because it only regulates commercial speech, which is entitled to reduced protections
under the First Amendment") (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban
forms of communications more likely to deceive the public than inform it.")).
227 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Alex Kozinski,
Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U.L. REV. 960, 973 (1993)).
228 As a result, most trademark cases involving parodies are not discussed here. However, see
discussion of First Amendment issues both with trademark infringement and trademark dilution
claims in Mattel Inc., 296 F.3d at 900. ("Were we to ignore the expressive value that some marks
assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach upon the zone protected by the First
Amendment"). See also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publ'r, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The
Constitution does not, however, permit the range of the anti-dilution statute to encompass the
unauthorized use of a trademark in a noncommercial setting such as an editorial or artistic
context"). In Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grotanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999) the court concluded
that a parody (First Amendment) "defense" did not apply and there was likelihood of confusion and
thus infringement. The court said, "We have accorded considerable leeway to parodists whose
expressive works aim their parodic commentary at a trademark or trademarked product ... but
have not hesitated to prevent a manufacturer from using an alleged parody of a competitor's mark to
sell a competing product." Id. at 812-13.
229 Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). In a
footnote, the Ninth Circuit said, "[w]e reject outright Penguin and Dove's claim that the injunction
in this case constitutes a prior restraint in violation of free speech guaranteed by the United States
Constitution." Id. at 1403 n.ll (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'n, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir.
1994), cort. denied 513 U.S. 1112 (1995)); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 1989),
cart denied, 492 U.S. 907; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).
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not likely to be confused as to the source, sponsorship or approval." 230 In applying
the multi-factor test for determining likelihood of confusion, the court noted the 8
factor list was not exhaustive; other factors could be relevant in certain cases, and
there was no mechanistic formula to apply in determining likelihood of confusion. 231
Even though Dr. Seuss clearly involved a nominative use by Penguin of Dr. Seuss
marks, the court only reviewed and affirmed the preliminary injunction based on
232
likelihood of confusion, not on the basis of a separate nominative use defense.

D. False Endorsement
Use by an advertiser of the name of a famous person is a nominative use of that
person's name by a third party, sometimes resulting in claims of false endorsement
under section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C § 1125.233 There are two different
bases for liability under section 43: (1)"false representations concerning the origin,
association, or endorsement of goods or services through the wrongful use of
another's distinctive mark, name, trade dress or other device" and (2) "false
advertising" about the "qualities of goods or services".2 34
Some courts have
interpreted the types of representations covered under false representations broadly
enough to cover items not traditionally thought of as marks, including famous
235
names.
230 Dr.

Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1405.
Id. at 1404.
232 See id.
Gripe sites and other cases involving domain names on the Web that use
trademarks of other companies often involve non-commercial uses, so they also are not discussed
here, even though those situations involve nominative uses and have not applied nominative fair use
defenses. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v.
Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
233 In contrast to 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000), which only prohibits infringement of registered
marks, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) prohibits certain uses of "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact.. ." 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 1125 (2000).
2:1 L. S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 575 (7th Cir. 1993); see also
Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 920 (1995);
and Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1080 (1993).
235 Waits v. Frito-Lay,Inc., 978 F.2d at 1106 (involving the imitation of a singer's "gravely"
voice, the Ninth Circuit said "courts have recognized false endorsement claims brought by plaintiffs,
including celebrities, for the unauthorized imitation of their distinctive attributes, where those
attributes amount to an unregistered commercial 'trademark."'); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving the use of the likeness of Vanna White, the Ninth
Circuit said, "In cases involving confusion over endorsement by a celebrity plaintiff, 'mark' means
the celebrity's persona"); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604, F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1979); Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Cf Advanced Res., Int'l.
v. Tri-Star Petroleum Co., 4 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The concept of mark may be broadly
defined yet it does not stretch so far as to embrace ARI's report"). Plaintiffs may also file false
endorsement claims under various state laws not discussed in this article. Even if cases involving
claims of false endorsement are more appropriately considered false advertising than false
designation of origin claims under the Lanham Act, by analogy the ability of courts to apply a
likelihood of confusion test in such cases supports the argument there is no need to replace the
likelihood of confusion test with a separate nominative fair use defense for trademark infringement
claims.
231
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In Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., the executors of the estate of Princess Diana
sued Franklin Mint Co. for false endorsement under § 1125(a)(1). 236 The plaintiff
based its claims on defendant's use of the name and likeness of Princess Diana on
commercially sold jewelry, plates, dolls and advertisements for these products after
her death. 237 The Ninth Circuit explained, "[ulnder the law of false endorsement,
likelihood of customer confusion is the determinative issue."2 38 The court noted that
between 1981 and 1997, many products bore the name and likeness of Princess
Diana, who had neither endorsed nor objected to any of these products, and many of
these products were largely indistinguishable from the defendant's products.239 The
court concluded that consumers had no reason to believe the defendant's products
240
were endorsed by Princess Diana.
The court then switched to using the nominative fair use defense in analyzing
whether there was false endorsement under § 1125(a).241 The court explained that
the distinction between descriptive and nominative fair use was important for two
reasons.2 42 First, they were governed by different analyses, and second, descriptive
fair use complements the likelihood of customer confusion analysis "whereas the
nominative fair analysis replaces the ... analysis." 243 The court concluded the

236 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002). The applicable law (of
Princess Diana's domicile, Great Britain) did not recognize a post-mortem right of publicity. Id. at
1149. In Waits, the Ninth Circuit held the celebrity had standing. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107-10.
Some circuits have expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach on standing in cases of
celebrities. See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir.
1998) ("We reject the Ninth Circuit's approach"). For two additional cases discussing whether a
person other than a competitor has standing to file a suit under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, see
Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 872-73 (10th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l. Corp.,
Inc., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993).
2:7 Cairns,292 F.2d at 1144.
238 Id. at 1149.

239 Id.
240 Id. at 1150.
241 Id. at 1149. In the Introduction to its analysis of the false endorsement claim, the court
said, "[u]nder the law of false endorsement, likelihood of consumer confusion' is the determinative
issue." Id. The court noted that many products bearing the likeness of Princess Diana had been on
the market for years, even though Princess Diana had neither endorsed nor objected to the products.
Id. It concluded, "Under these circumstances, there was no likelihood of confusion as to the origin of
Franklin Mint's Diana related products." Id. at 1150. "In addition, Franklin Mint is entitled to a
'fair use' defense for its references to Princess Diana to describe its Diana-related products" and
subsequently applied the nominative fair use test to the case. Id. at 1150-55. This use of "in
addition" suggests that the Ninth Circuit may in certain cases consider the nominative fair use test
as a supplement to, rather than as a substitute for, the traditional likelihood of confusion test. See
also Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving false endorsement claims in which the Ninth Circuit
analyzed both likelihood of confusion and nominative fair use). Perhaps the Ninth Circuit treats
false endorsement cases as sui genoris, or perhaps the Ninth Circuit is evolving to using nominative
fair use as a supplement to the traditional likelihood of confusion test. Even if the Ninth Circuit
now applies both in some cases, similar questions would arise: what authority does a court have to
impose a burden of proof on the defendant on likelihood of confusion or on "fair use" in a trademark
infringement action in the case of nominative uses, when § 1115(b)(4) does not apply unless the
defendant is using a mark only to describe the defendant's product?
242 Cairns,292 F.2d at 1150.

243

Id.
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defendant's use of the name and likeness of Princess Diana was a permissible
nominative fair use. 244
In short, the court first concluded there was no likelihood of confusion. 245 Then,
246
using the nominative fair use defense, the court concluded the use was a fair use.
This is another case that supports the argument that a separate nominative fair use
test is unnecessary because the traditional likelihood of confusion test can bring
about the same result.

E. Switching the Burden of Productionvs. the Burden ofPersuasion
The split in the circuits over nominative fair use may in part be the result of
247
confusion over the difference between "burden of proof' and "burden of production."
Burden of proof refers to "the ultimate burden of persuasion, in order to convince a
fact-finder, by the appropriate standard, based on all of the evidence." 248 In contrast,

the burden of production refers to the party who has, at a particular time, the burden
of providing evidence to the court. 249 The "burden of production, also called the
burden of going forward, is initially upon the person with the burden of proof, and
generally requires a production of sufficient evidence to support a finding in favor of
that person."2 5 0

Once a party with a burden of proof has submitted such evidence,

the "burden of production" may then shift "to the other party, who must, in turn,
produce enough evidence to raise a question of material fact." 251

However, during

this process, the burden of proof does not change "in the sense of answering the
252
question of who wins if all the evidence is inadequate or unconvincing."
Employment discrimination cases are one example of how the burden of
production and burden of proof can interact at trial. In Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.,253 Reeves sued Sanderson for age discrimination, and the
jury found for Reeves, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. 254 The Supreme Court assumed
the burden of production framework used in race discrimination cases applied to age

244 Id.
at 1155; se also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the movie
"Ginger and Fred" did not violate the Lanham Act rights of Ginger Rogers).
245 Cairns,292 F.2d at 1150.
2406Id.

247Soo Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dept. of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
U.S. 267, 272-86 (1994) (discussing history and meaning of burden of proof and production).
248 Bruner v. Office of Personnel Management, 996 F.2d 290, 293 n. 1 (Fed.Cir. 1993); see also
Director, 512 U.S. at 276. ("W]e conclude that as of 1946 the ordinary meaning of burden of proof
was persuasion, and we understand the APA's unadorned reference to 'burden of proof to refer to
the burden of persuasion.").
249 BrIner, 996 F.2d at 293.
250 Id.
This article does not address what constitutes sufficient evidence to switch the burden
of production to the other party.
251 Bruner, 996 F.2d at 293.
252 Id.
See also 2 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 409 (John W.
Strong ed., West Group 5th ed. 1999) (1954) ("The burden of persuasion becomes a crucial factor
only if the parties have sustained their burdens of producing evidence and only when all of the
evidence has been introduced.").
253 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
254 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999).
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discrimination cases. 255 Under this framework, the plaintiff has the burden of
256
producing evidence sufficient to "establish a prima facie case of discrimination."
Once the plaintiff has satisfied this burden, the defendant has the burden of
producing evidence "that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for
25 7
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."
The Court in Reeves added that this burden on the defendant was a "burden of
production, not [a burden of proof]," and in considering whether the defendant had
met that burden, the court could not weigh the credibility of the witness providing
that evidence. 258 The burden of proof remained with the plaintiff.259 The Court held
that plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. 260 The
261
Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.
Summary judgment proceedings can also reflect the interplay between burden of
proof and burden of production. 262 A party moving for summary judgment has the
burden to identify, for the court, the portions of the record the party believes
"demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."2 63 If the party
opposing summary judgment has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not
required to submit affidavits, but may rely on "pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file."2 64 If the moving party satisfies this burden
of production, the party with the burden of proof cannot rely on its pleadings to
oppose summary judgment but must produce evidentiary material permitted by Rule
56(c) to show there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. 265 In Celotex, the Court
reversed the D.C. Circuit's holding that defendant Celetex's motion for summary
judgment was defective, because Celetex had not submitted any evidence with its
motion tending to negate plaintiff Catrett's exposure to Celetex's asbestos
products.2 66 The Supreme Court remanded the case in order to determine "the

255 Id. at 142.
(stating case precedents "have 'established an allocation of the burden of
production and an order for the presentation of proof in... discriminatory-treatment cases"'.). See
also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (stating "[t]he
complainant ... must carry the initial burden ...of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination").
256 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
257 Id.(quoting Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
258 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
25$ Id. at 143 (stating "the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.").
260 Id.at 153-54.
201

Id. at 154.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ("The moving party is 'entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing
on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof [at trial].").
262

263
264
265

Id.at 323.
Id.at 324.
Id. The Court in C&]otex said the nonmoving party did not have to produce evidence that

would be admissible at trial. Id. The Court stated "Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment
motion to be opposed by any kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere
pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to
make the showing to which we have referred." Id.
266 Id. at 321 ("The majority of the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's summary judgment
was rendered 'fatally defective' by the fact that petitioner 'made no effort to adduce any
evidence .. .to support its motion."').
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adequacy of the showing made by respondent [Catrett on his exposure to Celetex's
asbestos products] in opposition to petitioner's [Celetex] motion for summary
judgment" and "the question of whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible
267
evidence, would be sufficient to carry respondent's burden at trial."

In Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v LG Electronics USA, Inc., the district court
discussed the burden of proof, within the context of a motion for summary judgment
for a case involving claims of trademark infringement and false designation or
origin. 268 The district court explained that when "the moving party did not have the
burden of proof, he need only show that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at
trial."269 On the other hand, when "the moving party bears the burden of [proof] at

trial, the moving party's initial summary judgment burden is higher 'in that it must
show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of [proof] and that the
evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it."'270
Courts determine, during a civil proceeding, whether a party has met its burden
of production, whereas the finder of fact-often a jury-determines whether the
party with the burden of persuasion has met that burden. 27 1 Courts "generally
attempt to resolve burden allocation questions by deferring, when possible, to
legislative intent."272 In situations where a plaintiff does not have access to evidence

that the defendant considers important, or that will help the defendant, it is logical
to place the burden of production on the defendant, as long as it does not shift the
burden of proof imposed by statute.273

The burden of production, in other words, may switch to the defendant in a
trademark infringement case after the plaintiff has presented its evidence, albeit
probably without any formal announcement. 274 In that situation, the defendant
would have the burden of producing evidence on likelihood of confusion, without
changing the ultimate burden of persuasion.2 7 5 If the defendant did not put forward

267

Id

at 327. The court stated "the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion" Id. at 328. The issues remanded to the D.C. Circuit include the "adequacy of the
showing made by the respondent" and "whether such a showing would be sufficient to carry
respondent's burden of proof at trial. Id. at 327.
268 Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. LG Elec., No. 1:03-CV-414, 2005 WL 3088339, at *1 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 17, 2005).
2 9 Id. at *2.
270 Id. (quoting Arnnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002)).
271 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 3:4, at 232-33 n.2
(Lawyers Cooperative Publishing 7th ed. 1992).
272 Id. § 3:14. See also Steadman v. S.E.C., 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981) ('[W]here Congress has
spoken, we have deferred to 'the traditional powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evidence and
standards of proof in the federal courts' absent countervailing constitutional restraints.").
273 So Fishman, supra note 271, at §§ 3:24-3:28 (discussing some factors that can warrant
shifting the burden of production); see also MeCormaek, supranote 252, § 338.
274 See Raco Car Wash Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 730 F.Supp 695, 702 (S.C. 1989) (stating "[e]vidence
that the defendant intentionally copied a product feature or term is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of secondary meaning and shift the burden of production to the defendant.").
275 If at the close of a plaintiffs case the defendant moves for a directed verdict, the court could
deny the directed verdict and indicate that if defendant did not present evidence, she would grant a
directed verdict for the plaintiff. In that case the burden of production would have switched to the
defendant. On the other hand, the court could deny the motion for directed verdict without
comment, and that might simply mean if the defendant did not put on any evidence, there had been
sufficient evidence submitted by the plaintiff to send the case to the jury and not that the court
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any evidence after plaintiff rested, the plaintiff would be entitled to a directed verdict
276
on liability.
The fact that a plaintiff may not present all the evidence relevant to a defense of
nominative use does not mean there is a need for a separate affirmative defense. It
simply may mean the defendant needs to recognize that the burden of production
may have switched to the defendant to put on evidence about the nominative fair use
factors identified by the Ninth and Third Circuits.
For instance, in Ty v. Publication, Ty could have put forth its evidence on
likelihood of confusion resulting from Publications's use of the Beanie Baby marks
without mentioning the disclaimers that Publications had placed on the front cover of
the books. 277 Recognizing that the burden of production may have switched to them,
Publications could have put on evidence about the disclaimers, and argued that
based on these disclaimers, Ty did not meet its burden of proving likelihood of
confusion. There would have been no creation of an unauthorized defense, no
switching of the burden of proof, and the parties would have presented all the
necessary evidence to the jury or court for its consideration of the nominative use in
the case. There is simply no need for a separate, affirmative nominative fair use test
if the courts apply the traditional multi-factor tests flexibly.
The Federal Circuit expressly discussed shifting the burden of production in a
false designation of origin counterclaim under the Lanham Act in Thompson v.
Haynes. 278 The counterclaimant presented evidence of confusion, there was no
credible evidence in the record to rebut that evidence, and the district court found for
the counterclaimant. 279 Yet Thompson, the counterclaim defendant, argued that the
counterclaimant had the obligation to present another witness on the issue of
confusion. 28 0 The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, stating, "Thompson
confuses the burden of [proof] in the ...counterclaim, which remains with [the

counterclaimant] ...with the burden of going forward with the evidence-the burden
would then grant plaintiff a directed verdict. Some might argue as a practical matter the burden of
production was on the defendant in the later case, and certainly the opportunity for production
would then be on the defendant. Whether announced or unannounced, in the first example, the
burden of production would have switched to the defendant.
276Directed verdicts and judgments as a matter of law for a plaintiff in a civil case are rare,
but in the appropriate situations federal courts can grant them. See, e.g., Marrero v. Goya of Puerto
Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 22 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[T]he party with the burden of proof is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law only if it has established its case by 'testimony that the jury is not at
liberty to disbelieve.'') (quoting Jordan v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir. 1984); see also
Serv. Auto Supply Co. of Puerto Rico v. Harte & Co., Inc., 533 F.2d 23, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1976) (stating
a directed verdict in "favor of the party having the burden of proof is rare", but allowed where that
party "has established by testimony that the jury is not at liberty to disbelieve." However, "the
standard of proof to be met is a strict one."); see also 9A WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, Civil 2d § 2535, at 325-29, (West Publishing Company 2d ed. 1995) (1971) ("Not
surprisingly ... a motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted less frequently for the party
who carries the burden than it is for the opposing party."); see also Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonald,
152 U.S. 262, 283-84 (1894) (stating "the court may... direct a verdict for the plaintiff or the
defendant ... where the evidence is undisputed, or is of such conclusive character [to that]
court .. ").
277 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ'n Int'l Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 WL 464688 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005).
278 Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
279 Id. at 1375-1376.
280Id.
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of production-that can shift back and forth."2 8 1 The Federal Circuit added that once

the counterclaimant met its burden of production on confusion, "the burden of going
forward with the evidence shifted to Thompson to rebut [counterclaimant's] showing
of actual confusion." 282 However, the burden of proof had not changed. 283 Although
not involving a nominative use defense, the procedure recognized in Thompson, of
shifting the burden of production but not the burden of proof, is applicable to cases
284
alleging trademark infringement involving nominative uses.

IV. CONCLUSION
The separate roads traveled by the Ninth and Third Circuits reveal an
insurmountable problem with creating and applying a separate fair use test: they
are roads Congress did not authorize.
There is no basis for the Ninth Circuit's road of imposing the burden of proving
likelihood of confusion on the defendant, because the Lanham Act places that burden
on the plaintiff. 28

5

Congress did create an affirmative defense for a defendant who

only uses a mark in its primary descriptive meaning to describe defendant's
product. 28 6 The failure of Congress to create any affirmative defense for nominative
uses of a competitor's mark shows that, under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff in a
trademark infringement case involving nominative use must retain the burden of
28 7
proof for likelihood of confusion.
Similarly, there is no basis for the Third Circuit's road of creating a fair use
defense for nominative uses of marks. 28 8 The Third Circuit's creation of such test
falls into a similar trap to that created by the Ninth Circuit. Because Congress has
only enacted fair use as a defense to the use of a mark in a primary descriptive sense,
courts cannot legislate a fair use defense for a defendant's nominative use of a
mark.

289

There is no reason, moreover, to bend what Congress has enacted, because
rejecting a separate fair use test and keeping the burden of proof on plaintiff should
not result in unfair outcomes. Courts can and should apply the multi-factor tests
flexibly to take into account matters such as the context of the advertisement in
which the defendant used the plaintiffs mark.2 90 In addition, the parties and courts
should recognize that after the plaintiffs presentation of evidence, the burden of
production-but not the burden of proof-may switch to the defendant, so that the

281 Id. (quoting Dir. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries,
512 U.S. 267, 272-74 (1994).
282 Thompson, 305 F.3d at 1377.
283 _Td. at 1377.

28MId.

285 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004).
286Id. at

118.

Id.
288 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 233 (3d Cir. 2005).
28) Id. at 235.
290 Cambell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
287
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defendant can present evidence on elements relevant to likelihood of confusion that
291
plaintiff avoided or did not possess.
By keeping the burden of proof for likelihood of confusion with the plaintiff, and
by rejecting a separate fair use test for nominative uses, the Supreme Court would
end the conflicting tests in the circuits over nominative uses. Also, by applying the
traditional tests flexibly and recognizing that the burden of production may switch to
the defendant in cases of nominative use, the federal courts would have settled upon
a method of resolving trademark infringement claims involving nominative uses that
are both fair and consistent with the expressed will of Congress under the Lanham
Act.
Will Rogers once said, "If I studied all my life, I couldn't think up half the
number of funny things passed in one session of Congress."292 Although that
statement from the 20th Century has a certain ring of truth to it, the statement of
Blackstone perhaps 200 years earlier should control on the issue of resolving the
circuit split on the existence and application of a nominative use defense: because
Congress enacted the Lanham Act, "the judges are not at liberty to reject it, for that
were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be
293
subversive of all government."

291 Nissan
292

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).
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See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 160.

